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INTRODUCTION
In the canon of equal protection, it is seemingly well-settled that inequality may
be remedied either by leveling up, improving the treatment of the disadvantaged class, or
leveling down, bringing the better-off group down to the level of those worse off. 1 The
presumptive permissibility of leveling down is viewed as an inherent feature of equality
rights and is not limited to equal protection; it applies in the statutory context as well, so
long as not expressly prohibited by statute.2 The acceptability of leveling down in
response to inequality is even invoked to question whether equality has any normative
appeal at all, since it may serve as the vehicle for producing an outcome which, by
utilitarian standards, may seem inefficient and undesirable.3 As one of the leading
constitutional law texts puts it:
Even if we could give substantive content to the equality requirement, it is
not clear why it has any normative appeal. Although the demands of the
equal protection clause can be satisfied by extending the contested benefit
to a broader group, the government need not respond in this fashion. It
may also fully satisfy the demand of equality by denying both groups the
contested benefit.4
Utility aside, the leveling down problem casts doubt on whether conventional
equality jurisprudence serves the interests of those whom it supposedly protects.5 The
permissibility of leveling down confronts persons disadvantaged by inequality with a
double-bind: challenge the inequality and risk worsening the situation for others instead

1

In this context, the phrase “leveling down” makes the most sense when the subject of the
challenged inequality is a sought-after benefit (as opposed to a burden sought to be lessened). However,
the same phenomenon may occur in equality-based challenges to the allocation of burdens. In the latter
case, the decision-maker would extend the burden to those previously free of it, rather than lifting it from
those disadvantaged by it. For the sake of brevity, this Article uses the term “leveling down” to refer to the
general scenario where the advantaged group is made worse off (either by withdrawing benefits or
extending burdens) in order to achieve equality with the disadvantaged group.
2

For discussion of statutes that expressly prohibit leveling down remedies, see the discussion infra
at Part I.C.3.
3

Such a utilitarian objection to leveling down assumes that the utility loss from the withdrawal of
the benefit is not outweighed by shifting the resources to other purposes with greater public benefit. For
example, if leveling down resulted in resources being put to better use, the utilitarian objection to leveling
down loses its force. This assumption may be defensible, given that the decision to offer the benefit in the
first place presumably rested upon a determination that the value of the benefit chosen outweighed that of
other possible uses of those resources.
4
5

GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480 (Aspen Law & Business 4th ed. 2001).

See, e.g., JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 101 (Princeton University Press 1999) (“Feminists can hardly welcome rulings like the
victories of William Orr, who reneged on court-ordered alimony payments…. After Orr, Alabama was
under no obligation to make its alimony law gender-neutral (although it did); the state was free to abolish
all alimony, as Texas has done.”).
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of improving one’s own situation, or continue to endure unlawful discrimination.6 This
Article argues that there is a way out of this double-bind: to recognize that leveling down
is not always consistent with the meaning of equality as reflected in U.S. discrimination
law.
The current approach to leveling down rests on two contestable understandings.
First, it implicitly relies on a principle of equal treatment as the exclusive meaning of
equality, without taking into account alternative understandings of equality which would
render leveling down problematic in certain settings. Second, it proceeds from an
abstracted and objectified analysis of equality that ignores the lived experience of
inequality and implicitly privileges the perspective of those doing the abstracting.
Current analysis of leveling down treats equality as if it were about balancing faceless
pieces of clay on a scale with the sole goal of arriving at equal weights in either direction.
As much critical scholarship has shown, that kind of abstracted analysis often
incorporates privileged norms that obscure the full extent of injuries to subordinated
persons.7 By injecting the lived experience of inequality back into the equation, leveling
down is revealed as a questionable strategy that is sometimes used to preserve
dominance, contrary to the values of equality.
As an example of how leveling down can thwart rather than secure equality, the
lesser known case of Cazares v. Barber adds a human dimension to the problem.8 Elisa
Cazares was fifteen years old and a student at the Tohono O’Odham High School on the
Tohono O’Odham Nation reservation in western Arizona when she became pregnant.9
Cazares, a member of the Papago Indian Tribe, was ranked first in her sophomore class,
served as a leader in student government, and actively participated in a number of student
activities.10 When the school, operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the
Department of the Interior, obtained a charter in 1989 entitling it to induct members of
the National Honor Society, Cazares had every reason to expect that she would be
included among them.11 However, the school’s selection committee found Cazares
6

See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 8-9 (2d ed.
2003) (discussing the prevalence of “double-binds” confronting subordinated groups, and defining doublebinds as “situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to penalty,
censure or deprivation”).
7

So much critical scholarship emphasizes this theme, that it defies comprehensive citation in one
brief footnote. For a very small sampling, see, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality,
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (indicting abstract principles of equality as failing to secure meaningful equality
for women); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (2d
ed. 2000) (compiling writings by critical race scholars containing rich critiques of formal principles of
equality and neutrality as masking deeper racial biases); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769
(2002) (critiquing conventional discrimination law for reinforcing implicitly privileged and assimilationist
norms that place demands on members of subordinated groups to convert, pass and cover their identities).
8

Cazares v. Barber, Case No. CIV-90-0128-TUC-ACM, slip op. (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990).

9

See Nat Hentoff, The Moral Education of a Native American, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1990, at
A25 (editorial page).
10

Id.; Deborah M. Levy, Sex in High School: Boys Play, Girls Pay, LEGAL TIMES, June 11, 1990,

11

Hentoff, supra note 9, at A25.

at 24.
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unworthy of membership because she was pregnant, unmarried, and not living with the
father of her future child.12 Cazares sued in federal district court, challenging her
exclusion under both Title IX and the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment. The district court found that the school district had discriminated against
Cazares on the basis of sex in violation of her rights under both Title IX and equal
protection, and entered an injunction ordering that she be included in the school’s
induction ceremony.13 However, the victory proved to be a hollow one: the school
responded by canceling the ceremony and terminating its participation in the National
Honor Society.14
Whether the school district complied with the equality guarantee turns on one’s
conception of equality and the values that it protects. This, in turn, depends on one’s
prior commitments and aspirations for equality law.15 If legal guarantees of equality
require only formal equality, satisfied by an end to differential treatment, then the school
district’s actions are difficult to challenge. However, if equality law includes a richer
kind of equality principle that recognizes injuries other than tangible differences in
treatment, then the cancellation not only failed to secure equality, it placed it farther out
of reach. Although all of the students were treated the same with respect to the denial of
National Honor Society participation, Elisa Cazares was left no better off, and quite
possibly worse off, for having “won” her sex discrimination case. The cancellation may
have been even more stigmatizing to Cazares than her initial exclusion: the school
deemed her so unworthy of membership in the honors society that it preferred to cancel
the NHS completely rather than include her as an honoree. Further, it set her up as the
scapegoat responsible for disappointing the expectations of the students (and their
parents) who otherwise would have been inducted into the NHS.
The current understanding of leveling down’s compatibility with equality norms
may be traced to one of the earlier and more prominent cases where this tactic was
successfully employed, Palmer v. Thompson.16 That case arose out of an equal protection
challenge by African American residents of Jackson, Mississippi, to the city’s operation
of racially segregated recreational facilities, including public swimming pools.17 Of the
city’s five publicly operated swimming pools, four had been restricted to whites only,
leaving only one open to African Americans.18 Three African American residents of

12

Cazares v. Barber, Case No. CIV-90-0128-TUC-ACM, slip op. (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990).

13

Id. In support of this ruling, the court pointed to evidence that a male student who had fathered
a child out of wedlock had been accepted into the chapter, while Cazares, who was otherwise qualified, was
denied entrance. Id.
14

See Cazares v. Barber, Case No. CIV 90-128 TUC ACM (Mar. 1, 1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 753
(9th Cir. 1992) (explaining aftermath of the injunction).
15

This language is loosely borrowed from Martha Chamallas, whose work in feminist legal theory
has shown “how a difference in starting points and basic commitments can alter both what we describe as
the law and our aspirations for what the law should be.” CHAMALLAS, supra note 6, at xxiii.
16

403 U.S. 217 (1971).

17

Id. at 219. The city also operated its public parks on a racially segregated basis. Id. at 218.

18

Id. at 218.
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Jackson obtained a declaratory injunction affirming their right under the equal protection
clause to the desegregated use of the city’s public recreational facilities.19 However,
rather than integrate the pools, the city decided to end its role in providing public pools to
city residents, closing the four pools that it owned and relinquishing its lease on the
fifth.20 The pool closures prompted a second lawsuit by African American residents of
Jackson, this time challenging the closures as a violation of equal protection. The district
court, the Fifth Circuit, and finally the U.S. Supreme Court all upheld the city’s action as
a legitimate response to the equal protection violation caused by the prior segregation.21
Although the rationale for upholding leveling down responses has shifted
somewhat since Palmer, the underlying premise—that equality law has little or nothing
to say about leveling down as a response to inequality—has remained largely
unchallenged. More than three decades after Palmer, leveling down the treatment of the
favored group continues to be a viable strategy for thwarting equality claims. In addition
to Cazares, leveling down actions or threats in recent litigation include the following:
In a Title IX challenge to inequality in men’s and women’s intercollegiate
athletics, Brown University proposed to remedy the Title IX violation by

19

Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff’d, 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The district court declined to enter an injunction ordering the city to integrate
its public facilities. The court’s opinion exemplifies racial bias in judicial decision-making. The court
rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to pursue the action as a class action, suggesting that the plaintiffs were not
representative of other members of their race, and noting that “voluntary separation of the races in the use
of public facilities has operated smoothly and apparently to the complete satisfaction of all concerned for
many years.” Id. at 541. The court attributed recent assertions of rights by African Americans to “the selfstyled Freedom Riders” who “aroused strained racial feeling,” and explained the existing racial segregation
in housing and public facilities in Jackson based on the choices made by the city’s “colored citizens.” Id.
Finally, the court denied injunctive relief partly because the plaintiffs failed “to show that their individual
needs require injunctive relief,” and partly because of the court’s high esteem for Jackson’s (white) city
leaders. In contrast to its pejorative treatment of the African American plaintiffs, the court lavished praise
on the city defendants:
The individual defendants in this case are all outstanding, high class gentlemen and in my
opinion will not violate the terms of the declaratory judgment issued herein. They know
now what the law is and what their obligations are, and I am definitely of the opinion that
they will conform to the ruling of this Court without being coerced so to do by an
injunction. The City of Jackson, a municipality, of course is operated by some of these
high class citizens. I am further of the opinion that during this period of turmoil the time
now has arrived when the judiciary should not issue injunctions perfunctorily, but should
place trust in men of high character that they will obey the mandate of the Court without
an injunction hanging over their heads.
Id. at 543.
20

Palmer, 403 U.S. at 219. The city parks and other previously segregated facilities within them,
other than the pools, were kept open and maintained on an integrated basis.
21

Id.
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cutting the number of opportunities available to male athletes until they
reached parity with the lower number of opportunities for female athletes.22
In response to a challenge brought under a city human rights ordinance to the
University of Pittsburgh’s denialof spousal benefits to same-sex partners, the
state legislature passed a law prohibiting any interpretation of local antidiscrimination ordinances that would result in the extension of benefits to
same-sex couples.23 Under the legislation, the only available remedy, in the
event that a court found that the university unlawfully discriminated based on
sexual orientation, would be the elimination of benefits for married couples.24
After losing an equal protection challenge to its male-only admissions policy,
the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) threatened to become private and
conducted a study of the feasibility of discontinuing its status as a public
institution. This option was explored as way to remedy the equal protection
violation by eliminating VMI as a public institution altogether instead of
admitting women.25

22

Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 214 (D. R.I. 1995), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
101 F.3d 155, 186 (1st Cir. 1996).
23

58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2181 (“An ordinance adopted by a municipality which requires, or the
effect of which is to require, the provision of health insurance or other employee health care benefits shall
not apply to a State-owned or State-related college or university.”). The legislature’s action responded to
the litigation in Henson v. University of Pittsburgh, Commission on Human Relations, E-96-003 (1996).
See John M.R. Bull, State to Ban Same-Sex Benefits, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 1999, at A1
(quoting statement from spokesperson for Governor Tom Ridge who signed the bill: “We see what’s
happening in Pittsburgh as an intrusion … on the institution of marriage.”).
24

See Respondent’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Henson v. University of Pittsburgh,
No. E-96-003, filed with the Commission, Nov. 24, 1999 (on file with author) (arguing that the case should
be dismissed because the state statute forbids the Commission from ordering the relief sought); Mem. and
Order of the Commission, Dec. 8, 1999, No.E-96-003 (permitting suit to proceed and construing state
legislation as limiting possible remedies, but not precluding a finding of discrimination). The University
filed its own action in state court, seeking and obtaining a preliminary injunction against the Henson
plaintiffs and the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations enjoining the litigation from proceeding, on
the grounds that the state legislation foreclosed the extension of benefits to same-sex partners and
preempted the lawsuit. University of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, No. G.D.
99-21287 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (on file with author). After obtaining the preliminary injunction, the
university filed a motion to have the injunction made permanent. See Bill Schackner, Pitt Wants City
Barred From Benefits Case, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 25, 2000, at C2. After ten months of
negotiation, the Henson plaintiffs and the university agreed to suspend litigation while the university
formed a committee to study its options for providing same-sex benefits. See Bill Schackner, Pitt May End
Gay Benefits Dispute: ALCU to Suspend Suit While University Studies the Issue, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, May 9, 2001, at A1. The committee was empanelled in June of 2001, and in April of 2002,
released its report recommending that the extension of domestic partnership benefits was not the “best
course” for the university at this time. See Memorandum from the Special Committee to Study Domestic
Partnership Benefits, to Chancellor Mark Nordenburg (Apr. 30, 2002) (on file with author). The case
remains in limbo as of this writing.
25

See New York Times staff, To Keep An All-Male VMI, Its Alumni Consider Buying It, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1996, at A11; David Reed, All-Male VMI Might Go Private, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 28,
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In response to successful litigation challenging inequality in public school
funding under the New Jersey constitution, then-Governor Christine Whitman
proposed a plan to level down spending in wealthier school districts to reach
equality with poorer districts.26
Several school districts charged with discriminating against gay and lesbian
student groups in violation of the federal Equal Access Act have responded by
banning, or threatening to ban, all extracurricular student clubs.27

1996, at 22. VMI’s Board of Visitors ultimately rejected the proposal to go private by a one-vote margin.
See Donald P. Baker, By One Vote, VMI Decides to Go CoEd; Nation’s Last All-Male Military School to
Enroll Women Starting in ’97, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A1.
26

See Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) (declaring unconstitutional state funding scheme
that permitted wealthier school districts to add to the per-student allotment from the state without giving
sufficient funds to poorer school districts to modernize and repair school buildings); Neil MacFarquhar,
Whitman Offers Fiscal Plan for Parity in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1996, at 1. See generally Martha
West, Equitable Funding of Public Schools Under State Constitutional Law, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
279 (1999) (discussing the New Jersey school funding litigation).
27

See, e.g., Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ. of Boyd County, No.
03-17-DLB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7356 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 2003) (holding that school board violated the
Equal Access Act in excluding Gay Straight Alliance because, even though it voted to suspend all student
clubs, it continued to permit other clubs to use school facilities; but noting that the Board could have
complied with the Act if it had implemented a ban on all student clubs); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v.
Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (C.D. Utah 1999) (holding that school
could exclude Gay Straight Alliance because it maintained a closed forum and did not allow student groups
that are not directly related to the curriculum). See also Gay Student Groups Fight for Acceptance, IAC
(SM) Newsletter Database ™, No. 3, vol. 12, Mar. 1, 2000 (from NEXIS) (referring to source: “Gay
Students Stake Their Ground,” by John Ritter for USA Today, Jan. 18, 2000) (Noting that “[m]any school
boards have denied [gay and lesbian] clubs the right to congregate on school grounds,” and that “[s]ome
have even gone as far as prohibiting all extracurricular clubs in order to prevent a gay-straight club from
meeting”); Joseph Landau, Ripple Effect, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 2003, at 12 (discussing a Texas
school district’s response to student effort to start a Gay-Straight Alliance by “banning all school groups
that promote criminal behavior”); Randy Furst, Gay Straight Alliance Gains Limited Status as Orono
Student Group, STAR TRIB., Aug. 14, 1998 at 1B (discussing response by Minnesota school district which
created two tiers of student organizations when students tried to form a Gay Straight Alliance, grouping the
GSA with other informal student groups in the second tier); Jeff Gottlieb & Kate Folmar, O.C. District’s
New Rules for Clubs Trigger More Protests, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2000, at B1 (discussing Orange county
school board decision to ban all extracurricular school clubs in middle and elementary schools to keep out
gay student clubs); Esther Pan, Safety is Priority for Gay Students, Speaker Says, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 10, 1997, at 1F (noting Alaska school board member’s suggestion of banning all extracurricular
clubs in response to student request to form a Gay Straight Alliance); Katherine Kapos, Majority Favors
Clubs as Granite District Holds Hearings on a Controversial Issue, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 17, 1997, at B2
(discussing debate in Salt Lake City over whether to ban all student clubs or allow the formation of gay
student clubs). Other schools, not willing to ban clubs completely have instituted new parental consent
requirements for all student clubs in response to the formation of gay student clubs. See Stacy Milbouer,
Gay Graduate Tells How Group Helped Him Cope, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1999, at 1; Barbara
Whitaker, School Board, Facing Suit, Agrees to Recognize Gay Club, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2000, at A18.
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These cases differ in many respects, but they share one important feature: in each case,
the assumption that leveling down would permissibly remedy the unlawful inequality was
largely uncontested.
Even when it is not raised overtly, the presumptively available option of leveling
down hangs over potential discrimination claims like a dark cloud, undermining the
effectiveness of equality rights, and even deterring such claims from being brought in the
first place. My initial interest in this topic stemmed from my own experience
representing female athletes in Title IX challenges to discrimination in school athletic
programs. In my conversations with potential plaintiffs, there was nothing more chilling
to their consideration of litigation than their fear that a lawsuit would result only in the
loss of men’s opportunities, and that they would be scapegoated as spoilsports. In
addition to its power to thwart specific challenges to inequality, the uncritical acceptance
of leveling down functions to undermine popular support for equality law, as is evident in
the recent controversy over whether Title IX should be abandoned or diluted based on the
perception that it has resulted in the leveling down of men’s athletic opportunities.28
Despite its pervasiveness, the problem of leveling down in equality law has
received scant attention in legal scholarship. Issues of how to define discrimination and
close the gap between law and widespread inequality have taken precedence for many
scholars writing in related areas. Leveling down as a remedy to inequality takes center
stage in practice only after the inequality in question has been recognized as actionable.
For the past two decades, with few exceptions, the trend in the courts has been to narrow
the types of bias and discrimination within the reach of equality law, both statutory and
constitutional.29 Those who challenge inequality often encounter insurmountable hurdles
at the liability stage in proving unlawful discrimination. Consequently, questions of how
to remedy discrimination arise less frequently in legal scholarship than concerns about
the limited scope of legally recognized discrimination.
Yet, beliefs about leveling down as an acceptable remedy to inequality very much
influence prevailing understandings of the meaning of equality as guaranteed in law.30
The conventional understanding of leveling down bolsters and reinforces a selective and

28

See Welch Suggs, Federal Commission Considers Reinterpreting Title IX, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 6, 2002, at A54 (discussing the debate over Title IX and allegations by wrestlers
and other male athletes that Title IX has resulted in losses in their sports opportunities); see also Deborah
L. Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
13, 20-22 (Fall 2000-Winter 2001) (discussing the backlash against Title IX fueled by charges that Title IX
has resulted in serious losses to male sports opportunities). For the time being, the current Administration
has decided not to revise Title IX. See Valerie Strauss & Liz Clarke, Sex Bias Ban Upheld for School
Athletics, WASH. POST, July 12, 2003, at A1.
29

See generally Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation
and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 747-53 (2001) (discussing and critiquing the limits of
modern antidiscrimination law).
30

See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (“rights and remedies are inextricably intertwined…. Rights are dependent on
remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence”);
Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 593 (1983) (“Thus, when people disagree in
their assessments of the relative ‘effectiveness’ of a particular remedy in curing the violation of a right,
they are often disagreeing about how the right itself should be defined.”).
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overly narrow conception of equality, masking interpretive choices and contributing to
the view that equality itself is misguided, in law and in theory. For example, in the one
area of legal scholarship that has paid significant attention to leveling down, it is invoked
to undermine the normative appeal of equality rights altogether. In a debate recently
rekindled by renewed critiques of equality, critics and defenders of equality argue about
whether the permissibility of leveling down indicts equality as a principle of justice.31
Both the critics and defenders assume a greater degree of flexibility in permitting leveling
down than is necessary. A more contextual analysis of the case law and real-world
examples of leveling down demonstrates that there is room for further development of
equality-based limits.
This Article contends that courts and commentators have too readily assumed that
leveling down is an acceptable, if unfortunate, response to discrimination, and that the
flexibility of equality law in this respect has been significantly overstated. Part I
examines current doctrine and mines existing precedent for possible limitations. A
survey of the case law shows that there is more room for contesting the validity of
leveling down than is generally acknowledged. Although lower courts typically follow
Palmer’s approach, Supreme Court precedent does not foreclose a more critical analysis
of leveling down and its relationship to equality. Indeed, the Court has shown some
discomfort with leveling down remedies to inequality, and has struggled to articulate
limits—albeit, ones that are inadequately theorized and fail to capture the potential for
conflict with the values of equality. Although the Court has not yet done so, there is
room in the doctrine for further development of equality-based limits on leveling down.
Part II seeks to develop a more complete understanding of leveling down and its
relationship to equality law. It begins by exploring the content of equality law, arguing
that the fundamental principle of equality requires equal concern, a broader principle than
mere equal treatment. An equal concern principle must be sensitive to inequality in
social relations and reject actions that devalue and exclude persons from equal
membership in a shared community. Recent scholarly work on the significance of
expressive harms and the reproduction of status inequality and social stratification
illustrates how some leveling down actions may violate a principle of equal concern.
Insights from this literature also undermine one of the most commonly held beliefs for
why leveling down should not cause great concern: the faith that the political process
will adequately check leveling down because the majority will not unnecessarily deny
itself benefits. Understanding the significance of status in intergroup relations exposes
the political process as an insufficient check on leveling down when it functions as a
strategy for preserving social inequality.
Part III applies this framework to examine particular examples of leveling down
and how they fare under an equal concern principle. This section first examines the three
cases of Palmer, Cazares, and the Virginia Military Institute’s threat to privatize, and

31

For recent critiques of equality rights, see Christopher Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1210 (1997); Christopher Peters, Slouching Towards Equality, 84 IOWA L. REV. 801 (1999). For
responses by scholars defending equality against these critiques, see Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of
Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U. L. REV. 693 (2000); Kent Greenawalt, “Prescriptive Equality”: Two Steps
Forward, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1997); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 IOWA L. REV.
377 (1999); Joshua D. Sarnoff, I Come to Praise Morality, Not to Bury It, 84 IOWA L. REV. 819 (1999).
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explains why the leveling down in each case should be viewed as a violation of equality
law. It then explores three types of cases where leveling down may fit comfortably with
an equal concern principle: (1) where the injury from the discrimination is a formal
equality injury, fully remediable by the end of differential treatment; (2) where some
leveling down is necessary to set a sustainable baseline consistent with equal concern;
and (3) where the benefit at issue is so distorted by privilege that equal concern requires
the relinquishment, rather than the extension, of unjust privilege. As these examples
show, any analysis that does justice to equality law must attend to the socio-historic facts
of the cases and remain sensitive to the social meaning expressed by leveling down.
Finally, Part IV contrasts this Article’s approach to leveling down with that taken
by those scholars who have written about leveling down in the debate over equality.
Critics of equality raise the permissibility of leveling down as part of their indictment of
equality’s normative appeal. Defenders of equality respond to these critics by arguing
that leveling down is not so problematic as to warrant the rejection of equality rights, and
that equality’s critics have overstated the extent to which leveling down is permissible.
In my view, neither side in this debate adequately explores the relationship between
leveling down and equality law. The existing discourse on equality’s value and the
leveling down objection reflects an overly abstracted view of equality and insufficient
attention to the relational injuries of inequality that leveling down may exacerbate. Both
sides— equality’s critics, especially, but also equality’s defenders—too readily assume
leveling down’s consistency with equality rights. A more nuanced understanding of
leveling down would enrich the debate over equality’s value.

I.

THE TREATMENT OF LEVELING DOWN BY THE COURTS

The possibility that leveling down might conflict with equality law has not been
foreclosed by courts so much as not thoroughly considered. For the most part, lower
courts, with little or no discussion, continue to take their lead from Palmer. Palmer’s
acceptance of the pool closure set the tone for future cases by viewing differential
treatment as the touchstone of discrimination. Although Palmer’s reasoning was
expressly disclaimed in later Supreme Court precedent, the discriminatory intent standard
that replaced it has not functioned, and is not likely to function in the future, as a
meaningful limit on leveling down. Still, there is some precedent that supports setting
limits on leveling down as a response to inequality, at least in certain circumstances.
None of the limits to date have been fully developed or adequately tethered to a basis in
inequality law. But their very existence suggests some doctrinal discomfort with the
presumptive acceptability of leveling down remedies to inequality. The bottom line of
this trek through the case law is that the prospects for regarding leveling down more
critically are not as bleak as generally supposed, even if they require additional
theoretical work.
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A. Palmer v. Thompson Revisited: Formal Equality and Discriminatory Intent
The Court’s resolution of the equal protection issue in Palmer v. Thompson,32 and
its treatment of Palmer in later decisions, provides a starting point for understanding the
prevailing judicial approach to leveling down. Justice Black’s opinion for the majority in
Palmer began with the rather obvious statement that nothing in the Constitution places
“an affirmative duty on a State to begin to operate or continue to operate swimming
pools.”33 Framing the issue in terms of equal access to swimming pools, Justice Black
viewed the decision to close the pools as one that did not provide white residents with
any benefit or service that was denied to black residents.34 The Court then turned to the
soon-to-be answered doctrinal question of what role a defendant’s intent plays in an equal
protection analysis. The Court decided Palmer five years before its decision in
Washington v. Davis rejecting a discriminatory effects standard and requiring proof of
discriminatory intent to obtain heightened scrutiny of facially neutral practices under the
equal protection clause.35 However, in Palmer, a majority of the Court took the opposite
position and proclaimed the irrelevance of the Jackson city council’s motives to the equal
protection analysis.36 Justice Black’s opinion then waded through a series of prior
Supreme Court decisions that might be thought to conflict with this pronouncement,
recasting them as cases in which the seemingly neutral denial of a benefit was really a
facade for ongoing discriminatory treatment.37 The Court then distinguished Palmer

32

403 U.S. 217 (1971).

33

Id. at 220.

34

Id. To critics of formal equality, this will sound strikingly similar to the Court’s opinion in
Geduldig v. Ailello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (“There is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not.”).
35

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

36

Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224 (“[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.”).
37

Id. at 222. For example, the Court’s decision in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), forbidding a school district from closing its public schools in
response to a desegregation order, was explained in Palmer based on the county’s continuing involvement
in maintaining segregated schools by covertly partnering with private, racially exclusive schools. See
Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221-22. The Palmer Court offered a similar explanation for Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967), which affirmed the California Supreme Court’s ruling that a statewide referendum
allowing private parties to engage in race discrimination in real estate transactions violated equal
protection. This decision was explained in Palmer as an appropriate recognition that the referendum
constituted a government endorsement of private discrimination and did not, unlike the pool closures in
Palmer, represent a true leveling down of treatment (although the Court did not use this terminology). See
Palmer, 403 U.S. at 223. Finally, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), a decision striking down a
redistricting scheme that diluted the votes of minority voters, was explained as decided not based on
discriminatory intent, but on the discriminatory effects of the redistricting legislation. See Palmer, 403
U.S. at 225; but see id. at 266-68 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the pool closures did indeed
differently harm African Americans in Jackson).
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from the prior precedents, highlighting it as a case where the differential treatment had
fully ended with the pool closures.38
The dissenters in Palmer disagreed with the Court about the role of intent in an
equal protection analysis and found the city’s actions to have been motivated by a
discriminatory purpose. Writing the principle dissent, Justice White (joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall) concluded that “closing the pools without a colorable
nondiscriminatory reason was every bit as much an official endorsement of the notion
that Negroes are not equal to whites” as official segregation.39 Justice White began his
discussion of the case by providing a detailed history of Jackson city officials’
intransigent resistance to racial integration and their avowed determination to resist
desegregation of the city’s public facilities.40 To Justice White, the pool closures did not
remedy the harm of segregation, and may have exacerbated it.41 As he put it, the “closed
pools stand as mute reminders to the community of the official view of Negro
inferiority.”42
Five years later, Justice White’s view of the significance of motive in an equal
protection analysis prevailed in Washington v. Davis.43 The Court’s revised stance in
Davis appeased the most prominent criticism of Palmer at the time, that an actor’s
discriminatory intent should invalidate an otherwise legitimate state action under the
equal protection clause.44 After Davis, Palmer’s critics could take comfort in the belief
that, however problematic the result in Palmer, equal protection doctrine would
henceforth ensure the absence of discriminatory intent behind a leveling down response.

38

The distinction was somewhat fuzzier than the majority let on. As Justice White observed in
dissent, one of the formerly public pools continued to be operated by a private owner on a whites-only
basis. Id. at 252 (White, J., dissenting). In addition to this distinction, the Court also suggested in Palmer
that the different result in school desegregation cases might be attributed partly to differences in the public
importance of pools and schools, although the Court made less of this distinction than the state’s role in
perpetuating discrimination. Id. at 221 n.6; and see discussion infra at Part I.C.1.
39

Id. at 266-67 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas dissented separately, arguing that the
Ninth Amendment provided a basis for invalidating the city’s action. Id. at 231-40. Justice Marshall also
wrote a separate dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and White, taking issue with the majority’s view that
the pool closures equally affected all persons regardless of race. Id. at 271-73.
40

Id. at 246-60 (White, J., dissenting).

41

Id. at 266 (“by closing the pools solely because of the order to desegregate, the city is
expressing its official view that Negroes are so inferior that they are unfit to share with whites this
particular type of public facility, though pools were long a feature of the city’s segregated recreation
program.”).
42

Id. at 268.

43

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

44

This critique of Palmer was offered most prominently by Paul Brest. See Paul Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 S. CT. REV. 95.
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Under current doctrine, the presence of a discriminatory motive may provide a basis for
challenging an otherwise acceptable leveling down response.45
However, the intent standard has turned out to be not much of a limit on leveling
down. The difficulty with focusing on the motive behind a leveling down response was
foretold by Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Palmer. Justice Blackmun agreed with
the dissenters that an impermissible motive could give rise to an equal protection
violation (and he voted with the majority on this point five years later in Washington v.
Davis). Yet, he found Palmer to be a “’hard’ case” in which “there is much to be said on
each side.”46 Siding with the majority, he cited several factors that impressed him,
including that the city had not shut down its other recreational facilities under the threat
of integration, and his lack of conviction that the pool closures were “an official
expression of inferiority toward black citizens,” as Justice White and the other dissenters
contended.47
The problems associated with proving discrimination under an intent standard,
and the reluctance of courts to attribute discriminatory motives to public and private
actors, have been the subject of much scholarly criticism.48 The difficulties identified in
these well-founded critiques are no more surmountable when the search for intent occurs
at the leveling down phase of a case rather than at the point of determining an initial
violation.49 Under the prevailing version of the intent standard, it is extremely difficult to

45

Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (requiring challenger of
facially neutral practice to prove that the measure was adopted “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
adverse effects” on the disadvantaged group).
46

Palmer, 430 U.S. at 228 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

47

Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The other factors that Justice Blackmun cited were the
inessential quality of public pools, the fact that the pools had operated at a fiscal deficit, and the fear that
the city would be “locked in” to providing public pools for the indefinite future. Id. at 229-30.
48

For an incomplete sampling, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup
Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1277-90 (1998) (discussing extensive literature
on social psychology and cognitive bias demonstrating that much discrimination is not “intentional” in the
legal sense); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-1201 (1995) (discussing
the failure of an intent standard to capture cognitive bias and the actual mental processes that drive realworld discrimination); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that much discrimination is unconscious and
that a discriminatory motive standard is insufficient to capture it); David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and
the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989) (arguing that the Court settled on the intent standard
not for a principled reason, but because it feared the potential breadth of an effects standard, but arguing
that an intent standard, applied in a principled fashion, is also both sweeping and incoherent); Barbara
Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory
Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993) (criticizing the intent standard as reflecting white transparency, the
selection of legal standards based on implicit white norms); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson,
The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991)
(arguing that the intent standard deters the filing of legitimate claims because of the difficulty of proving
intent).
49

Cf. Paul Brest, Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1,
28 (1976) (acknowledging that the Court’s turn-around on discriminatory intent “does not necessarily
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prove discriminatory motive where another legitimate explanation is possible.50 Because
a decision to uniformly deny favorable treatment may always be explained in terms of
conserving resources and rearranging societal priorities, it is exceedingly difficult to
establish a discriminatory motive as the foundation for a leveling down response. Indeed,
in Palmer itself, Justice Blackmun noted that the pools had been running at a fiscal deficit
and deferred to “the judgment of the city officials that these deficits would increase.”51
Thus, even though Washington v. Davis reversed the rationale relied on by the majority in
Palmer, the Court’s shift to an intent standard does not necessarily unsettle Palmer’s
result.
The Court’s subsequent treatment of Palmer makes explicit the Court’s
understanding that the use of an intent standard might not have changed the result in that
case. Writing for the majority in Washington v. Davis, Justice White explained Palmer
as follows:
The holding was that the city was not overtly or covertly operating
segregated pools and was extending identical treatment to both whites and
Negroes.... [T]he legitimate purposes of the ordinance—to preserve peace
and avoid deficits—were not open to impeachment by evidence that the
councilmen were actually motivated by racial considerations.52
In Justice White’s revisionist account, Palmer stands for the principle that equal
protection is satisfied when persons of all races are treated the same and proof of a
discriminatory purpose is lacking.53 Ironically, the intent standard that Justice White
fought for in his dissent in Palmer turned out to be inadequate to capture even the
discriminatory motive that he, at the time, thought present in that very case. That Palmer

obviate the problems implicit in Palmer v. Thomspon,” given the difficulty of determining “whether a
decision was discriminatorily motivated”).
50

See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260, 279 (accepting the state’s proffered legitimate purpose for a
veteran’s preference with “a devastating impact upon the employment opportunities of women,” absent
proof that it was enacted “because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a
stereotypic and predefined place”); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
266 (impact alone is insufficient to establish discriminatory intent where there is a legitimate, neutral
explanation for the action taken). See also Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White
Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 26-29 (1990) (discussing the Court’s refusal
to see any perpetrators of discrimination in Milliken v. Bradley, and the rhetorical pull of “white innocence”
in the Court’s race discrimination jurisprudence).
51

Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring). However, Justice White’s masterful telling of the history
of resistance to integration by Jackson city officials leaves no doubt that fiscal concerns had nothing to do
with the real reason for the pool closures. Id. at 249-60. Moreover, although Justice White challenges only
the evidentiary basis for the city’s argument that integrated pools would require greater expenditures to
keep the peace, such justifications should not be considered race-neutral motives, given their obvious
pandering to racial hostility.
52

Washington v. Davis at 243-44.

53
See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 923 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Palmer has come to be understood for the principle that only when the races are treated dissimilarly is there
a violation of equal protection.).
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can be plausibly explained as a case lacking proof of discriminatory intent shows just
how anemic the intent standard is when applied to leveling down.
Post-Washington v. Davis cases provide little reason for optimism that an intent
standard, as applied by the Court, will provide a meaningful tool for policing leveling
down responses to discrimination claims. In Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation,54 the Court expressly noted the difficulty of
discerning a discriminatory motive, citing Palmer in support of this acknowledgement.55
In City of Memphis v. Greene,56 the Court continued to explain Palmer as a case that
involved neither differential treatment nor a discriminatory motive, citing it to support its
holding that Memphis could close a street connecting a black and white neighborhood,
absent evidence of a discriminatory purpose, because the closing did not confer any
benefit on whites that was refused to blacks.57 In actuality, as in Palmer, a good deal of
evidence suggested that the city’s action was at least partially motivated by a
discriminatory intent.58
The upshot is that the Court’s turn-around on intent in Washington v. Davis does
little to set meaningful limits on leveling down. As long as leveling down is uniform and
ends the differential treatment, it is likely to elude a discriminatory intent standard.
Indeed, lower courts confronted with leveling down proposals typically assume that it is a
permissible response to discrimination without any serious inquiry into intent. Two
examples from more recent cases reflect the current approach in the lower courts.
In the Cazares case, discussed in the introduction, both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit expressed displeasure with the school’s response, but did not view it as
inconsistent with the equality guaranteed by either Title IX or the Constitution.59 After
the school cancelled the awards ceremony and terminated its participation in the National
Honor Society in response to the litigation, the plaintiff sought attorney’s fees under the
Equal Justice Act, which authorizes fees for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases
against the government. In litigation over the attorney’s fees petition, both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit cited the school’s response in canceling the honor society as a
discretionary factor thatsupport ed an award of fees in excess of the statutory cap.60
54

429 U.S. 252 (1977).

55

Id. at 266 n.11.

56

451 U.S. 100, 102 (1981).

57

Id. at 105.

58

Id. at 136-38, 143-44, 155 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Ross, supra note 50, at 1, 30-31
(criticizing the Court’s opinion in Greene as distorted by “black abstraction,” abstracting the lives of
African Americans to avoid empathy, and “the refusal to place the case in any real and vivid social
context”). Likewise, evidence suggesting the presence of a discriminatory motive was also present in
Palmer. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 246-61 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing evidence of discriminatory
purpose).
59

Cazares v. Barber, Case No. CIV 90-128 TUC ACM (Mar. 1, 1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 753 (9th
Cir. 1992). The district court’s order had said that if the school district holds the National Honors Society
ceremony, then it must include the plaintiff. Cazares v. Barber, Case No. CIV-90-0128-TUC-ACM, slip
op. (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990).
60

Id.
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The courts’ treatment of the cancellation under the Equal Access Act thus shows
some discomfort with the leveling down remedy in that case, but the courts did not
connect their concerns with any limits imposed by the underlying substantive law.
Neither court questioned whether the school’s response might violate the equality
principle embodied in Title IX or the Constitution.61 Judge Kozinski, who dissented from
the panel decision affirming the award of attorney’s fees, was the most explicit on this
point. He objected to the lower court’s reliance on the cancellation to support a higher
fee award, stating “[i]t doesn’t matter, of course, why a party chooses one of two
permissible ways of complying with a district court’s order.”62 Neither the majority nor
the district court offered any response to Kozinski’s point that cancellation was a valid
remedial choice, presumably agreeing at least that neither Title IX nor the equal
protection clause prevented the school from canceling the ceremony, even though they
disagreed with Judge Kozinski about whether the cancellation could support a higher
award of fees under the fee shifting statute.63 The bottom line is that the school’s
response satisfied the requirements of equality without any inquiry by the court into the
school district’s intent in canceling its participation in the honor’s society.
Another case involving a Title IX claim, Cohen v. Brown University, likewise
treated a proposal to remedy discrimination by leveling down as compatible with equality
law without any inquiry into discriminatory intent. In that case, Amy Cohen and other
female student-athletes at Brown University challenged Brown’s failure to provide equal
opportunities to play varsity sports for male and female athletes. Although this case did
not include an equal protection claim, Title IX also prohibits intentional discrimination
and would have provided recourse for an adverse action motivated by a discriminatory
intent.64 Yet, the First Circuit gave Brown seemingly unlimited discretion to achieve
equality by leveling down, without any inquiry into whether Brown’s proposal was
motivated by a discriminatory intent.
The leveling down issue came before the court after Brown had been found in
violation of Title IX. Rather than impose its own remedy, the district court gave Brown
the opportunity to come forward with a remedial plan, emphasizing the flexibility of the
law in terms of potential remedies:

61

Id.

62

959 F.2d at 756-57 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

63

Under the Equal Justice Act, a prevailing party may be awarded attorney fees in litigation
against the United States, “unless the Court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). However, to grant
fees against the government in excess of $75/hour, the court must find that the government litigated in “bad
faith.” Cazares, 959 F.2d at 754. The district court found that the government exhibited an “arrogant and
calloused attitude” toward the litigation from the beginning and cited the school’s cancellation of the
ceremony as “a clear indication of their attitude.” Cazares v. Barber, Case No. CIV 90-128 TUC ACM,
slip op. at 2 (Mar. 1, 1991). A majority of the appellate court found that the district court’s findings in this
regard were not clearly erroneous. 959 F.2d at 755.
64

See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (permitting damages claims
under Title IX in actions for intentional discrimination).
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Brown may achieve compliance with Title IX in a number of ways. It
may eliminate its athletic program altogether, it may elevate or create the
requisite number of women’s positions, it may demote or eliminate the
requisite number of men’s positions, or it may implement a combination
of these remedies. I leave it entirely to Brown’s discretion to decide how
it will balance its program to provide equal opportunities for its men and
women athletes.65
At the same time, however, the district court sounded a note of skepticism as to whether
Brown actually needed to eliminate men’s opportunities in order to achieve compliance,
as the university had claimed throughout the litigation:
Defendants frequently raised the specter of being forced by financial
constraints to eliminate men’s athletic opportunities in order to achieve
compliance under plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law. I feel compelled to
point out that an institution has much flexibility, even within a finite
resource base…. Thus, defendants’ plea that “[t]here is nothing further
Brown can do except cut, cap or eliminate men’s teams,”…is simply not
true. Brown certainly retains the option to distribute its resources in a way
that may slightly reduce the “standard of living” for its university-funded
sports in order to expand the participation opportunities for its women
athletes and closer approach equal opportunity between its male and
female athletes. Whether it will follow this course of action is, of course,
well within its discretion.66
The district court’s skepticism turned to disbelief when presented with the plan
for compliance submitted by Brown. Rather than accept the district court’s invitation to
lower the standard of living for its high-status teams in order to make way for new
playing opportunities for women, Brown proposed to cap existing men’s teams, while
recognizing several new junior varsity teams for women. In the event that the district
court found these measures inadequate—as it did, since the additional junior varsity
women’s opportunities were not comparable to existing men’s varsity opportunities67—
Brown proposed a back-up plan: eliminate men’s athletic opportunities until their
number reached parity with the lower number provided to women, with the end result
that no new athletic opportunities for women would be added.68
The district court rejected the back-up plan and chastised Brown for the draconian
nature of the proposal:

65

Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 214 (D. R.I. 1995).

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

See Cohen v. Brown, 101 F.3d 155, 186 (1st Cir. 1996) (summarizing Brown’s proposal for
compliance).
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In order to bring Brown into compliance … under defendants’ [plan], I
would have to order Brown to cut enough men’s teams to eradicate
approximately 213 men’s varsity positions. This extreme action is entirely
unnecessary…. The easy answer lies in ordering Brown to comply… by
upgrading the women’s gymnastics, fencing, skiing, and water polo teams
to university-funded varsity status…. This remedy would entail upgrading
the positions of approximately 40 women. In order to finance the 40
additional women’s positions, Brown certainly will not have to eliminate
as many as the 213 men’s positions that would be cut under Brown’s …
proposal.69
Although the district court did not explicitly find that Brown’s remedial proposal violated
Title IX, the court’s explanation for its ruling came close, suggesting a perceived conflict
between Brown’s proposal and the purpose of Title IX:
It is clearly in the best interests of both male and the female athletes to
have an increase in women’s opportunities and a small decrease in men’s
opportunities, if necessary, rather than, as under Brown’s plan, no increase
in women’s opportunities and a large decrease in men’s opportunities.
Expanding women’s athletic opportunities in areas where there is proven
ability and interest is the very purpose of Title IX and the simplest, least
disruptive, route to Title IX compliance at Brown.70
Concluding that Brown had not made a “good faith” effort to comply, the district court
imposed its own remedy, ordering Brown to add several new women’s varsity teams.71
The First Circuit treated the leveling down issue very differently.72 It did not
share the district court’s perception of anytension between Brown’s plan and Title IX,
and faulted the district court for imposing its own remedy rather than permitting Brown
to level down men’s opportunities until they reached parity with the women’s. The First
Circuit justified its ruling based in part on the view that the proposal fully satisfied the

69

Id. The difference in the numbers is due to the different ways in which institutions may comply
with Title IX: either by providing opportunities for men and women substantially proportionate to their
enrollment (men had approximately 213 too many opportunities to meet this standard) or by fully
accommodating the athletic interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex (Brown would have had to
add approximately 40 opportunities for women to meet this standard). See Brake, supra note 28, at 13,
47-49 (explaining the various ways institutions may comply with Title IX’s requirement of equal
opportunities to participate in sports). Even focusing on substantial proportionality as the path to
compliance, Brown still could have complied without cutting as many male athletes as it proposed if it
using the saved resources from the mens’ cuts to add some new opportunities for women, thus leveling
only part of the way down while still adding some new opportunities for women. Brown’s proposal would
have ensured that women received no gains whatsoever from the lawsuit.
70

879 F. Supp. at 187.

71

Id.

72

See Cohen v. Brown, 101 F.3d 155, 186 (1st Cir. 1996).
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equality required by Title IX.73 The First Circuit did not inquire into Brown’s motives
for its proposal to drastically cut men’s opportunities, despite the district court’s finding
that its proposal was not warranted by fiscal necessity or bya good faith desire to achieve
compliance without allocating new resources to athletics. 74 Brown ultimately chose not
to cut men’s spots and to comply instead by fully funding new varsity opportunities for
women, despite the court’s approval of the legality of its proposal to cut men’s
opportunities instead.75
The judicial approach to leveling down in Cazares and Cohen reflects the
prevailing assumption that leveling down satisfies equality law, and a reluctance to look
deeper. While, in theory, the existence of a provable, discriminatory intent will
undermine an otherwise valid, facially neutral leveling down response, courts typically
do not look past the surface of the uniform treatment itself. Even if they did, in light of
the widely shared and forceful critique of the intent standard, there is little reason to
believe that they would find anything other than simple neutrality.
Perhaps part of the reason for the judicial complacency toward leveling down is
the belief that it is self-limiting, subject to correction in the political process.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the majority will not often choose to fix inequality by
subjecting itself to more negative treatment without good reason for doing so. As Justice
Jackson observed in his well-known concurrence in Railway Express Agency v. New
York:
[There] is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will
apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be
visited upon them if larger numbers were affected…76
Although such confidence in the political process as a check on leveling down turns out
to be questionable when leveling down operates to serve the non-material interests of the

73

Id. at 185 (discussing principles of academic freedom, but noting that “academic freedom does
not embrace the freedom to discriminate”). The court stated, “[i]t is clear … that Brown’s proposal to cut
men’s teams is a permissible means of effectuating compliance with the statute.” Id. at 187. See also Neal
v. Board of Trustees, 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating “If a university wishes to comply with Title
IX by leveling down programs instead of ratcheting them up, as Appellant has done here, Title IX is not
offended”).
74

101 F.2d at 187 (discussing district court’s ruling).

75

See Lynette Labinger, Title IX and Athletics: A Discussion of Brown University v. Cohen by
Plaintiffs’ Counsel, 20 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 85, 91-94 (1998) (discussing the terms of the settlement of
the case).
76

336 U.S. 106 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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majority, as explained later in this Article,77 it may well provide some comfort to courts
in reviewing leveling down responses to inequality.
B. Doctrinal Discomfort with Leveling Down
Although the prevailing approach accepts leveling down as all that equality
requires, this acceptance sits somewhat uncomfortably alongside a vague judicial dislike
of leveling down remedies. As with much doctrine, there are indications of instability
and dissension underneath the surface. Some judges—such as the district judge in Cohen
v. Brown—express discomfort with leveling down and seek ways to thwart it. Such an
inclination is easy to understand if leveling down leaves some people worse off, and no
one better off, in terms of access to benefits and resources.78
Just such a utilitarian concern may have motivated the Court in one very early
equal protection case to reject the plaintiffs’ claim where the only remedy sought would
have taken away the benefits from the advantaged class. In Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Education,79 a case decided over fifty years before Brown v. Board of
Education,80 black taxpayers sued Richmond County, Georgia, seeking an injunction to
prevent the county from spending taxpayer funds to support a high school for white
students when there was no public high school in the county for black students.81 Justice
Harlan, writing for the Court, dismissed the claim, objecting that:
The substantial relief asked is an injunction that would either impair the
efficiency of the high school provided for white children or compel the
Board to close it. But if that were done, the result would only be to take
from white children educational privileges enjoyed by them, without
giving to colored children additional opportunities for the education
furnished in high schools. The colored school children of the county
would not be advanced in the matter of their education by a decree

77

See discussion infra at Part II.B.

78

Again, this objection assumes that the saved resources from leveling down would not be put to
better use, thereby effecting a net increase in the overall level of well-being.
79

175 U.S. 528 (1899).

80

347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court in Cumming dodged the issue of whether the county’s racial
segregation of schools itself violated the equal protection clause, stating that, although the plaintiffs argued
that it did in oral argument, “we need not consider that question in this case. No such issue was made in
the pleadings.” Cumming, 175 U.S. at 543. It was not until over half a century later that the Court was able
to see the inherent inequality in the state-enforced racial segregation of the schools. That “separate but
equal” was never really equal, however, was obvious to everyone even as far back as Cumming. That is,
the separate racial structures and facilities were “equal” only according to racist visions of the needs and
capacities of African Americans.
81

175 U.S. at 529-31. The plaintiffs’ choice of remedy reflected the realistic assessment that a
remedy seeking affirmative relief, requiring the county to establish and fund a high school for African
Americans, would have been met with possibly greater resistance. Since a court order requiring integration
was unthinkable at the time, the Court’s rejection of the injunction against spending left the plaintiffs with
no effective recourse.
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compelling the defendant Board to cease giving support to a high school
for white children.82
Justice Harlan suggested that, assuming the plaintiffs could prove an equal protection
violation—an assumption about which he expressed skepticism—83 the case might have
succeeded had the plaintiffs sought to force the county to spend money on education for
black students rather than seeking to forbid spending for the white high school.84 Justice
Harlan’s discomfort with the posture of the case might be read, in part, to suggest the
perspective that equality law should strive to improve the situation of the disadvantaged
group rather than take away benefits from the favored group.85
In discussing Justice Harlan’s reluctance to endorse a leveling down remedy in an
equal protection action, I do not mean to endorse either his conclusion or his reasoning.
Justice Harlan focused primarily on the implications of a leveling down remedy for the
advantaged group and its impact on the ability of white students to attend high school in
the county. He also observed that the remedy sought would not help black children in the
county, but he offered only a superficial analysis of this point, limited to the material
withholding of educational resources. As elaborated below, a central consideration in
evaluating leveling down should be whether it fully remedies all of the injuries, material
and nonmaterial, to the persons disadvantaged by inequality.86 Such an analysis should
explore the expressive meaning of leveling down and the relational harms of inequality,

82

Id. at 544.

83

Justice Harlan’s discussion of the merits of the equal protection issue foreshadowed the Court’s
adoption of an intent standard much later in Washington v. Davis, as well as the subsequent criticism of that
standard. In explaining the Board’s decision to expand its primary education programs for blacks rather
than offer a high school for black students, Justice Harlan blithely asserted that there was no bad intent
behind the county’s failure to offer a high school for black students. Id. at 544 (“We are not permitted by
the evidence in the record to regard that decision as having been made with any desire or purpose on the
part of the Board to discriminate against any of the colored children of the county on account of their
race.”).
84

Id. at 545 (“If, in some appropriate proceeding instituted directly for that purpose, the plaintiffs
had sought to compel the Board of Education, out of the funds in its hands or under its control, to establish
and maintain a high school for colored children, and if it appeared that the Board’s refusal to maintain such
a school was in fact an abuse of its discretion and in hostility to the colored population because of their
race, different questions might have arisen in the state court.”). However, given the long and tortured
history of the Court’s ambivalence about affirmative remedies in the school desegregation context many
decades later, this assessment reads more like a judicial platitude than a realistic appraisal of the plaintiffs’
chances.
85

It also might reflect Justice Harlan’s discomfort with an equal protection challenge to racially
segregated schools and his own racial biases. Indeed, the tone of Justice Harlan’s opinion expresses no
shock or outrage that the county failed to provide any high school education for African Americans,
suggesting that he found the school system sensible or at least understandable. See generally Donald C.
Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1994) (explaining that even those judges who try to
make logical and impartial decisions cannot be completely free from the influence of personal biases); Jody
Armour, Sterotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 733 (1995) (discussing racial bias in judicial decisionmaking).
86

See discussion infra at Parts II, III.
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from the perspective of the persons disadvantaged by the inequality, rather than engaging
in a utilitarian calculus that factors in the well-being of the advantaged group and the
costs of relinquishing inequality’s privileges. Nevertheless, although flawed in its
approach, Harlan’s resolution of the case suggests an early recognition that equality law
might be problematic if it allowed a leveling down response, and a possible openness to
interpretations that limit such responses.
A more recent expression of the Court’s ambivalence about leveling down is
found in Cannon v. University of Chicago.87 In Cannon, the Court ruled that Title IX
contains an implied private right of action for persons injured by sex discrimination in
federally funded education programs.88 In support of this ruling, the Court cited the
potential harshness of the express statutory remedy, the termination of federal funds to
educational programs that engage in discrimination—a type of leveling down response, in
that it deprives everyone of the benefits of federal funding rather than raising the
treatment of the disfavored group to match that of the favored group.89 Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, observed that Title IX’s purpose of providing individuals with
effective protection against discrimination would not be well-served by holding the
termination of funds to be the exclusive remedy.90 As Justice Stevens explained, “it
makes little sense to impose on an individual, whose only interest is in obtaining a benefit
for herself,…the burden of demonstrating that an institution’s practices are so pervasively
discriminatory that a complete cut-off of federal funding is appropriate.”91 This
consideration counsels against leveling down remedies more generally. The implication
is that a person who is harmed by discrimination and successfully prosecutes a
discrimination claim should benefit from the suit, and a concern that persons should not
be made worse off unnecessarily.92
Although outside the mainstream of judicial discourse, these cases suggest at least
some degree of judicial distaste for leveling down remedies. Yet they provide no
guidance as to when leveling down is illegitimate. Nor do they go so far as to suggest
that leveling down conflicts with the mandate of equality law. Rather, the concerns
seem to reflect a preference for solutions that raise, rather than lower, the material wellbeing of persons for reasons external to equality norms.

87

441 U.S. 677 (1979).

88

Id. at 717.

89

Id. at 704-705.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 705. Justice Stevens cited Justice Harlan’s opinion in Cumming to support a preference
for a remedy that does not achieve uniformity of treatment by lowering the level of treatment for everyone,
without any reference to the infamy of the case in its effective preclusion of legal challenges to racial
segregation at the time. Id. at 705 n.39.
92

Id. at 705.
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C. Seeds of Constraints
As the undertone of dissatisfaction with leveling down suggests, there is room
within the case law for exploring doctrinal limits on leveling down. Indeed, concerns
about the desirability of an interpretation of equality that results in leveling down have
spurred judicial efforts to cast about for rationales in support of rejecting leveling down
remedies. As yet, however, these rationales tend to be incompletely explained and, with
one exception, grounded in values distinct from equality.
1. The Significance of the Benefit
One potential limiting principle that the Court has floated draws the line based on
the importance of the benefit at stake, as weighed from the perspective of the majority.
Even if the dictates of equality may be satisfied by taking away recreational benefits like
public swimming pools, perhaps equality requires something more when a more
fundamental interest is at stake.93 Justice Black’s opinion in Palmer suggested this as a
potential limit by distinguishing the swimming pool closures in that case from prior cases
involving school closures, which the Court did not permit as a remedy to unlawful
segregation.94 Among other distinctions, the Court noted the comparatively greater

93

Of course, if the interest at stake is one that the Court recognizes as implicating a fundamental
right, state action that denies such a fundamental right receives strict scrutiny under the due process clause.
See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415, 433 (6th ed. 2000). And
in a narrow class of cases, the Court has applied strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause to state
actions that are facially neutral, but which disparately burden the fundamental interests of some persons,
even if the interest in question does not rise to the level of a fundamental due process right. See Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state poll tax requirement for voting in
state elections; even if the state is not constitutionally required to provide elections at all, a poll tax
disparately burdens the poor in their exercise of the vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(invalidating state requirement that all criminal defendants pay for their trial transcripts in criminal appeals;
even if the state is not required to provide criminal appeals at all, a fee requirement disparately burdens
indigent defendants in appealing their convictions). At present, the list of such fundamental interests is
short and not likely to expand any time soon. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez (ruling
that education is not a fundamental interest, and applying rational basis test under the equal protection
clause to uphold state funding system that disparately affects the education of poor children). Most of the
Court’s fundamental interest equal protection cases involve differential treatment of the interest at stake,
suggesting that deprivations that equally deprive everyone of the interest are less likely to be objectionable
under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating state
law sterilizing larcenists but not embezzlers under equal protection clause); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating state law permitting some residents but not others to vote in school
district elections without sufficiently weighty reason under equal protection clause). Thus, the significance
of the benefit as a potential limit on leveling down does not fit neatly within existing equal protection
doctrine. The discussion here presupposes that the interest in question is more important than some (for
example, schools are more important than swimming pools), and yet not so fundamental as to trigger strict
scrutiny under existing equal protection or due process doctrine.
94

See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that the
county’s decision to close public schools in response to a court desegregation order violated equal
protection); Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), aff’d, 365 U.S. 569 (1961)
(holding that state statutes authorizing the governor to close integrated schools were unconstitutional).
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importance of education.95 Contrasting the two contexts, Justice Black emphasized that
the Court has previously described public education as “‘perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.’”96 Justice Blackmun, concurring in Palmer,
sounded a similar note in listing his reasons for upholding the pool closures.97
The entirety of the Court’s opinion, however, suggests that this distinction was
ultimately less important than the Court’s perception of the state’s continuing
involvement in sponsoring segregated education, and its contrary perception with respect
to the city’s role in Palmer.98 The dissenters in Palmer explicitly disagreed with the
majority’s suggestion that inequality with respect to a relatively insignificant benefit
might legitimize inequality that would otherwise violate equal protection, and their view
has carried the day.99 Subsequent cases have explained Palmer based on the lack of
differential treatment and the absence of proof of discriminatory purpose, without
mentioning the relative significance of the benefit withheld.100
The musings of Justices Black and Blackmun in Palmer on the nature of the
benefit may have given them some comfort in believing that there was a stopping point to
the city’s strategy. Leveling down might be more palatable if a city could get away with
closing its pools to avoid integration, but not with taking similar action with respect to
more important public services. As a limiting principle, reliance on the significance of

95

In addition, Justice Black distinguished the cases on the ground that a discriminatory motive
was implicit from the statutes authorizing the closure of integrated schools, whereas, he implied, the motive
behind the pool closures was more ambiguous. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221 n.6 (“Of course there was no
serious problem of probing the motives of a legislature in Bush because most of the Louisiana statutes
explicitly stated they were designed to forestall integrated schools.”).
96

Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221 n.6 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).

97

Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The pools are not part of the city’s educational system.
They are a general municipal service of the nice-to-have but not essential variety, and they are a service,
perhaps a luxury, not enjoyed by many communities.”).
98

Id. (“More important, the laws struck down in Bush were part of an elaborate package of
legislation through which Louisiana sought to maintain public education on a segregated basis, not to end
public education.”).
99

Id. at 262 n.16 (White, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a public agency furnishes a service—regardless
of whether or not it is an ‘essential’ one—it must act in a nondiscriminatory manner with regard to that
service.”). That is, at least with respect to cases involving discrimination against a suspect class. Under
current law, differences in the nature of the benefit only make a difference where the discrimination does
not target a suspect class and the only path to strict scrutiny is through fundamental interest analysis.
100

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976) (describing Palmer as holding “that the
city was not overtly or covertly operating segregated pools and was extending identical treatment to both
whites and Negroes,” and that “the legitimate purposes of the ordinance—to preserve peace and avoid
deficits—were not open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually motivated by racial
considerations.”); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.11 (1977)
(explaining the result in Palmer based on the difficulty of discerning an impermissible legislative motive);
City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 105 n.7, 107 nn.10-11 (1981) (citing Palmer to support the
proposition that an action that does not involve differential treatment based on race and does not depend on
an invidious purpose will not violate equal protection); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 923 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citing Palmer to stand for the principle that differential treatment is the touchstone of an
equal protection violation).
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the benefit has the advantage of limiting the harms of leveling down to the cases that do
not (at least to the Court) matter so much.101 A limitation on leveling down based on the
significance of the benefit at stake has a certain utilitarian appeal as well, in that any
damage to the overall social welfare caused by leveling down would be minimized. As a
potential limit, this approach seems largely concerned with protecting the interests of the
majority by preventing a self-inflicted wound carried out in a fit of spite.
Despite this limited appeal, deciding the permissibility of leveling down based on
the significance of the benefit at stake is not a limit that adequately accounts for the
values protected by a substantive conception of equality. Benefits classified as relatively
unimportant, such as swimming pools and perhaps even National Honor Society
ceremonies, may nonetheless have a significant impact on social relationships and may
serve as a vehicle for generating powerful stigmatizing effects. Even if the tangible
effects of the deprivation are not as devastating as those that would result from the loss of
more significant resources and services, the nonmaterial harms do not necessarily depend
on the importance of the thing itself. Injuries to social status and expressive harms
caused by leveling down may be just as powerful, regardless of the relative significance
of the unequally distributed benefit.102 As a potential limit on leveling down, a focus on
the importance of the benefit merely ensures that the advantaged group does not achieve
gains in status and relational privilege at too great a cost to itself. It does nothing to
protect those disadvantaged by inequality from further injury.
2. Remedial Principles Favoring Extension of Benefits
A close reading of the case law reveals another possible limit fashioned by a set
of loosely defined remedial principles that favor curing inequality through extension
rather than the withdrawal of benefits, at least where the inequality arises from an
underinclusive statute. However, both the source and content of these principles are
unclear, as is the rationale for why they should apply in equality challenges. They seem
to stem from similar utilitarian concerns as those that prompted attention to the
significance of the benefit as a limit: a desire to avoid an outcome that may worsen the
overall level of welfare.103 Upon inspection, these remedial principles turn out to be very
weak limits on leveling down, easily trumped by a clear statement of legislative intent to
the contrary. Most importantly, they too are unconnected to any value relating to the
underlying equality claim.
The most prominent reference to remedial principles that might set limits on
leveling down is found in Heckler v. Mathews,104 an equal protection challenge by a male

101

The Court’s view of the relative triviality of what it saw as at stake in Palmer comes through
perhaps most clearly in its rejection of the plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Amendment challenge: “[T]he Thirteenth
Amendment is a skimpy collection of words to allow this Court to legislate new laws to control the
operation of swimming pools throughout the length and breadth of this Nation….” 403 U.S. at 227.
102

See discussion infra at Part II.B.

103

Again, such a calculation assumes that the losses from leveling down are not compensated for
by the diversion of the saved resources into more socially beneficial uses.
104

465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984).
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plaintiff to a provision in the Social Security Act (SSA) that allowed women, but not
men, to receive certain spousal benefits without subtracting any amounts received in
government pensions and without proof of financial dependency.105 Foreseeing that this
gender-based classification might encounter equal protection challenges, Congress
included a severability clause: in the event that a court found the provision
unconstitutional, the benefits conferred by the statutory exemption were to be withdrawn
from women rather than extended to men.106
Although the Court ultimately upheld the gender-based classification against the
equal protection challenge,107 it discussed the permissibility of leveling down in the
context of the male plaintiff’s standing, at issue because success on the claim would not
have raised men’s benefits.108 The Court rejected the challenge to standing, explaining
that the injury from the discrimination was not the lower level of benefits per se, but the
non-economic injury from the discriminatory treatment of similarly situated persons.
Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, explained the harm to the plaintiff as
follows:
[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating ‘archaic and stereotypic notions’
or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as ‘innately inferior’
and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community ... can
cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally
denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored
group.109
105

Id. at 731-33. The issue in Mathews was complicated by the compound statutory background
of the case. The SSA provision in question was part of a series of amendments to the Act in response to an
earlier Supreme Court decision, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977,) striking down a gender-based
presumption entitling wives and widows (but not husbands and widowers) to full spousal benefits without
proof of financial dependency. After the Goldfarb decision in 1977, Congress amended the statute to
eliminate the gender-based financial dependency requirement. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 730-32. However, to
ensure fiscal solvency and protect the reliance interests of those who planned their retirement based on the
earlier system, the amended Act revived the gender-based classification in one respect: it required persons
receiving spousal benefits to offset any monies received from a state or federal government pension, but
exempted from this provision those persons who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to
December, 1982, and who would have been eligible to receive unreduced spousal benefits under the preGoldfarb system. Id. at 732-33. In effect, wives and widows (but not husbands or widowers) who became
eligible for government pensions within a five-year grace period could obtain full spousal benefits without
proof of financial dependency and without offsetting for other pension monies. Id. at 733-34. This was the
statutory fix at issue in Mathews.
106

Id. at 734.

107

The Court found that Congress had sufficiently weighty reasons for reviving the gender-based
classification for a limited time to protect the reliance interests of persons near retirement, and that the use
of the classification was sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect those interests. Id.
108

The district court had found the severability clause to be an invalid attempt by Congress to
discourage challengers by defeating standing, and thus ordered the Secretary to extend benefits to the
plaintiff class. Id. at 735-36. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id.
109

Id. at 739 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). See
also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272-73 (finding male plaintiff had standing to contest order requiring
payment of alimony to ex-wife under state gender-based alimony statute, even though result might be to
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So framed, this non-economic injury conferred standing on the plaintiff because the
Court could redress it by ending the use of the advantageous formula to calculate benefits
for women.110
In the course of deciding that a withdrawal of benefits from women would redress
the plaintiff’s injury, the Court engaged in a more general discussion of the acceptability
of leveling down remedies. The district court in the decision below had invalidated the
severability clause as an effort by Congress to thwart possible discrimination claims by
“’making such a challenge fruitless.’”111 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that it
had “never suggested that the injuries caused by a constitutionally underinclusive scheme
can be remedied only by extending the program’s benefits to the excluded class.”112
Rather, “a court sustaining such a claim faces ‘two remedial alternatives: [it] may either
declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the
legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include
those who are aggrieved by the conclusion.”113 Indeed, the Court noted, it had
“frequently entertained attacks on discriminatory statutes or practices even when the
government could deprive a successful plaintiff of any monetary relief by withdrawing

require similarly situated women to pay alimony, rather than to invalidate order requiring plaintiff to pay).
Numerous cases have cited Mathews for the principle that plaintiffs have standing to challenge
discrimination even if they will not benefit tangibly if the challenge succeeds. See, e.g., Cruz v. Bowen,
672 F. Supp. 1300, 1304 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Warden v. State Bar of California, 53 Cal. App. 4th 510, 518
(Ct. App. CA 1997); Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States [IRS], 964 F.2d 1556, 1559-61 (5th
Cir. 1992) (in equal protection challenge to exemptions to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, holding that
plaintiffs had standing, even though the relief that they sought would eliminate tax breaks for others rather
than reduce their own tax liability, because disparate treatment itself is a recognizable injury). See also NE
Fla Chapter of Assoc Gen Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (“the ‘injury in
fact’ in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition
of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”).
110

Id. at 740. The Court’s recognition of nonmaterial injuries in equal protection cases provides
fertile ground for exploring equality-based limits on leveling down. However, Mathews stops short of
recognizing that nonmaterial injuries may be furthered, rather than remedied, by leveling down. The
Court’s appreciation of the intangible injuries from discrimination was limited to injuries resulting from
facially different treatment, without acknowledging that even facially neutral actions may inflict injuries of
devaluation and stigma. As argued below, leveling down may conflict with equality’s requirements where
it expresses unequal concern towards the challengers of inequality. See infra Parts II.B. & III.
111

Id. at 737.

112

Id. at 738 (citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-91 (1979), and Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 344, 351 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
113

Id. (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), and also
citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-91)). See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979) (“In every
equal protection attack upon a statute challenged as under-inclusive, the State may satisfy the
Constitution’s commands either by extending benefits to the previously disfavored class or by denying
benefits to both parties…); Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501, 504 n.4 (1977) (“we emphasize that Utah is
free to adopt either 18 or 21 as the age of majority for both males and females for child support purposes.
The only constraint on its power to choose is the principle … that the two sexes must be treated equally.”).
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the statute’s benefits from both the favored and excluded class.”114 Emphasizing the
general consistency of leveling down with equality rights, the Court stated:
[W]hen the ‘right invoked is that to equal treatment,’ the appropriate
remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accomplished
by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by the
extension of benefits to the excluded class.115
So far, the Court’s discussion is fully consistent with the conventional
understanding of leveling down as an acceptable fix for inequality. However, at this
point the Court’s opinion took an interesting turn. At the same time that it emphasized
the overall permissibility of leveling down as a remedy in a discrimination case, it
suggested that remedial principles might nonetheless place some limit on leveling down.
In a footnote to its discussion of the remedial flexibility of discrimination claims, the
Court stated that the remedial choice between leveling up or leveling down is “within the
‘constitutional competence of a federal district court,” and that “ordinarily ‘extension,
rather than nullification, is the proper course.’”116 The Court did not explain why a court
should ordinarily prefer extension, and cited only one case in support of such a
preference.117 In the same breath, the Court emphasized that a court “should not, of
course, ‘use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature,’” directing
courts instead to “‘measure the intensity of the commitment to the residual policy and
consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme that would occur by
extension as opposed to abrogation.’”118 Because it found this to be a case where
Congress had clearly expressed a preference for nullification rather than extension, the
Court found leveling down was not only permissible, but required.119 As framed by the
Court in Mathews, any preference for the extension of benefits only carries force when it
does not conflict with a contrary legislative intent.

114

Id. at 739 & n.6 (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins., 446 U.S. 142, 152-53 (1980); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 (1977); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351, 352 (1974); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975)).
115

Id. at 740 (quoting Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v.
Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931)).
116

Id. at 739 n.5.

117

Id. (citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 91 (1979)).

118

Id.

119

Id. The Court left open the door to a possible limit on leveling down remedies where “a
legislative attempt to thwart a court’s ability to remedy a constitutional violation would itself violate the
Constitution.” Id. at 739 n.5. The Court declined to address this argument, since it ultimately concluded
that the Court’s remedial powers were not thwarted by the severability clause (since a leveling down
remedy would still remedy the harm), but its treatment of the issue left open the possibility that a legislative
effort that does thwart a Court’s remedial power might violate the Separation of Powers. Discussion of the
Separation of Powers implications of legislative limits on court remedies is beyond the scope of this
Article, which is interested in how equality as a legal principle might place limits on leveling down.
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The source of the remedial preference asserted in Mathews for extension of
benefits remains something of a mystery. The one case cited in Mathews in support of
extension remedies, Califano v. Westcott,120 does not add much to an understanding of
why and when leveling down might be disfavored in an equality claim. In Westcott, the
Court unanimously agreed that a federal provision authorizing benefits to families with
unemployed fathers, but not unemployed mothers, violated equal protection, but split on
the question of remedy.121 Five Justices voted to extend the “unemployed father”
benefits to families with unemployed mothers; the remaining four Justices would have
enjoined the program until Congress amended the statute to cure the violation and select
its preferred remedial course. The majority defended its choice of extension by
characterizing prior equal protection cases as “suggest[ing] that extension, rather than
nullification, is the proper course,” citing two such cases,122 and noting that it had
“regularly affirmed District Court judgments ordering that welfare benefits be paid to
members of an unconstitutionally excluded class.”123
The decision does little to illuminate the source of, or justification for, a
preference for extension of benefits. The selection of the remedy in Westcott seemed to
turn more on congressional intent than any independent remedial principle favoring
extension as a remedy to inequality. The Court did cite “equitable considerations” in
support of the extension remedy, highlightingthe hards hip that would befall the 300,000
children of unemployed fathers who would otherwise be denied AFDC benefits.124
However, the Court justified its attention to this concern because of “a congressional

120

Id. (citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 91 (1979)).

121

443 U.S. 76, 79-80, 89, 93 (1979). There were two defendants in the case, the Secretary of the
former U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), and the Massachusetts Commissioner
of the state’s Department of Public Welfare. The federal defendant contested the finding on liability, but
did not contest the remedy; the state defendant accepted the liability finding but disputed the remedy,
arguing that the violation could be remedied by adopting a gender-neutral “unemployed principal wageearner” test. Id. at 78-79, 82-83 & n.4. The issue, then, was whether to fully extend benefits to families
with unemployed mothers, or partially level down by providing benefits at an intermediate level. No party
proposed leveling benefits all the way down to the level of the disadvantaged class (which would provide
no benefits to any families with unemployed mothers or fathers, regardless of wage-earner status).
122

Id. at 89 (citing Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 62, 637-38 (1974), and Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 & n.25 (1973)). This principle qualified the Court’s acknowledgement that
a court confronting an underinclusive statute has two remedial alternatives: extension or withdrawal of the
benefits in question Id. at 89 (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
123

Id. at 90 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Califano v. Silbowitz, 430 U.S. 924
(1977); Jablon v. Califano, 430 U.S. 924 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); U.S.
Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); and Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972)).
124

Id. at 90. As the dissent notes, such a calculus can be difficult to gauge. Id. at 96 (“There is
the possibility, not mentioned by the Court, that other hardships might be occasioned in the allocating of
limited funds as a result of court-ordered extension of these particular benefits.”). If utilitarian concerns
about how best to maximize social welfare are the guiding principles courts use in setting limits on leveling
down remedies, the dissent’s separation of powers argument, that Congress and not the Court should set the
balance, has some force. However, a limit on leveling down that stems from equality law, rather than
general equitable considerations, would be properly implemented by a court.
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intent to minimize the burdens” on AFDC beneficiaries in the event that part of the
statute was found unconstitutional.125 Thus, the existence, much less content, of any
independent equitable consideration favoring extension remains elusive.126 As in
Heckler, the asserted remedial principle ultimately collapses into the Court’s prediction
of what the legislature would have wanted.127
The pedigree and normative justification for the preference expressed in Mathews
and Westcott are at best opaque. Mathews cited only Westcott in support of the remedial
preference it espoused, and the two cases cited for this principle in Westcott merely select
the remedial course of extension with no discussion.128 These cases fall within a subset
of cases involving equal protection challenges to underinclusive statutes where the Court
has, with little or no discussion, opted for extending the more favorable treatment to the
disadvantaged class.129 In these cases, the Court has been guided by its sub silentio
reading of legislative intent, not a general remedial preference for leveling up—or at least
not one that it has articulated.130 This line of under-theorized cases stands in contrast to
125

Id.

126

In the end, the Majority saw no need "to elaborate … the conditions under which invalidation
rather than extension of an underinclusive federal benefits statute should be ordered” because no party had
presented that issue for review. Id. at 90. However, the Court’s framing of the issue, as about the form the
extension should take, and not about nullification versus extension, was a bit facetious; the state had argued
for a remedy that would have imposed some leveling down of benefits by tightening the requirements for
receipt of such benefits, although it would not have leveled the benefits all the way down to zero. The
state’s position squarely presented the issue of whether a partial leveling down remedy is acceptable in an
equal protection challenges to an underinclusive statute.
127

Although the majority purported to give Congress’ specific intent less weight on the question
of how to craft the extension—whether to level benefits all the way up or extend them only to those
families where the unemployed parent was also the principal breadwinner—at this stage too, legislative
intent carried the day. Id. at 83-82, 90-91. While giving lipservice to equitable concerns about needy
families if additional criteria, such as breadwinner status, were imposed on otherwise eligible families, the
Court again justified this concern by reference to Congress’ intent. Id. at 92 (expressing doubt that
Congress would approve of a remedy that incorporated a new dividing line, such as breadwinner status,
into the benefits scheme).
128

Westcott, 443 U.S. at 89 (citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) and Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
129

See, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: HISTORY,
PRACTICE, AND THEORY 209 (Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1996) (“Without discussing the matter, the
Burger Court mostly extended coverage of unconstitutional sex-based statutes to those who are aggrieved
by the exclusion.”).
130

For example, in Jimenez, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), cited in Westcott, the Court struck down a
Social Security Act (SSA) provision that discriminated against illegitimate children, and remanded the case
to give the plaintiffs a chance to show that they met certain judicially created criteria for receiving SSA
benefits. In effect, the Court rewrote the statute to conform to what it viewed as Congress’ rational
purposes underlying the statue—the prevention of spurious claims and the provision of support for the
dependents of a disabled wage earner—without explicitly discussing the rationale behind its remedial
choice or other remedial alternatives. Id. at 634-37. Likewise, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), the other case cited in Westcott, the Court implicitly extended spousal benefits to servicewomen on
the same terms as servicemen, without any discussion of a preference for extension over nullification, and
without an acknowledgement of other possible remedial choices. Id. at 691 n.25 (invalidating the statutory
scheme only insofar as it required a servicewoman to prove the dependency of her spouse). The Court
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other equal protection cases in which the Court has suggested that the choice between
extension and invalidation should be decided exclusively based on legislative intent,
without referring to any principle favoring the extension of benefits.131 When one
follows the thread of case law to Heckler, the general remedial principle cited turns out to
be the proverbial emperor with no clothes.
One final reed of support for a remedial principle favoring extension lies in an
early EEOC Guidance directing employers to cure any discrimination that results from
state-imposed special maternity benefits by extending such benefits to men, absent
business justification.132 The Guidance interprets Title VII to require that employers who
provide certain benefits to women in compliance with state law also must provide those
benefits to male employees, unless the employer can establish that business necessity
precludes offering the benefits to both men and women.133

seemingly viewed extension as consistent with Congress’ purpose to attract career personnel through the
provision of spousal benefits. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 n.25.
Although Frontiero cited three cases in support of the continuing validity of the remainder of the
statutory scheme, none of these cases discuss, much less endorse, a general preference for extension
remedies in equal protection cases. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(holding state workers compensation law that discriminated against “unacknowledged illegitimate”
children violated equal protection, and extending the right to recover to illegitimate children); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional state wrongful death statute that permitted
legitimate but not illegitimate children to recover in tort suit for wrongful death of parent, and extending
the rights to recover to illegitimate children); and Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d
466 (10th Cir. 1972) (finding equal protection violation in tax code’s gender-based denial of deduction for
the costs of caring for taxpayer’s dependent invalid mother where taxpayer is a never-married male, and
finding extension “logical and proper, in view of [the deduction provisions’] purpose and the broad
separability clause in the act.”).
131

See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (declining to
decide whether state statute that treated widows and widowers unequally in violation of equal protection
should be cured by extending benefits to widowers or taking them away from widows, and remanding to
state court to decide based on state legislature’s intent); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(vacating on equal protection grounds a sterilization order where the state statute in question sterilized
persons convicted of larceny but persons convicted of embezzlement, but leaving it to the state to decide
whether to broaden the statute so as to sterilize embezzlers as well); see also People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d
152, 218 (1984) (finding gender-specific state rape statute unconstitutional, and extending statute’s
coverage to persons previously excluded, rather than striking down the conviction, based on belief that
legislature would have preferred extension over invalidation); Johnson Bros. Liquor v. Com’r of Revenue,
402 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn. 1987) (“When a statutory scheme has been declared unconstitutional, our
primary goal in determining a remedy is, insofar as possible, to effectuate the intent of the legislature had it
known the statutes were invalid.”).
132

29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(4)(ii) (2002) (Apr. 5, 1972) (“As to other kinds of sex-oriented State
employment laws, such as those requiring special rest and meal periods or physical facilities for women,
provision of these benefits to one sex only will be a violation of Title VII. An employer will be deemed to
have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if: … (ii) it does not provide the same benefits for male
employees. If the employer can prove that business necessity precludes providing these benefits to both
men and women, then the State law is in conflict with and superseded by Title VII as to this employer. In
this situation, the employer shall not provide such benefits to members of either sex.”) (emphasis added).
133

If that is the case, the employer may comply with Title VII by refusing to provide the benefits
to either sex, in which case Title VII would preclude the conflicting state law. Id.
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Much like the Court in Mathews, the EEOC did not cite any reasons or legal
precedent for its requirement that employers must, absent business necessity, comply
with Title VII by extending the state-mandated benefits to men rather than withdrawing
them from women. During the time when courts were grappling with possible conflicts
between Title VII and state laws requiring the preferential treatment of maternity,134 this
portion of the EEOC Guidance received a rather lukewarm reception in the courts.135
Courts objected primarily that the state legislatures that passed laws requiring special
benefits for women did not intend to burden employers with the requirement of extending
similar treatment to men.136 Similar to the fate of the preference for extension cited in
Heckler, the EEOC preference retained little or no force when confronted with judicial
impressions of a contrary legislative intent.
Chasing down the source of a remedial principle favoring extension over the
withdrawal of benefits in a discrimination claim—so obliquely referenced in Heckler v.
Mathews and the EEOC Guidance—turns out to be like following a disappearing trail of
breadcrumbs. In the end, all that is clear is that any such principle is unconnected to the
values of equality and easily trumped by a contrary legislative intent.137 Still, the various
references to such a preference suggest a palpable, if inarticulate, receptivity to further
development of judicial limits on leveling down remedies. If such a limit were grounded
in equality principles, it is not at all clear why a conflicting legislative intent should
prevail, particularly if the source of the equality requirement were constitutional rather
than statutory. And even if the source of the equality guarantee were statutory, it is not
clear why legislative intent on the question of remedy would necessarily prevail if it
conflicted with the meaning of the equality guarantee itself.138
134

This period of uncertainty had ended by the mid-to-late 1980s, when the Supreme Court upheld
state statutes requiring preferential treatment for pregnant women as consistent with Title VII. See
California Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). By that time, other types of
“special treatment” state employment laws not involving pregnancy were vulnerable under equal
protection.
135

See, e.g., Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976); Arkansas v. Fairfield Communities Land
Co., 538 S.W.2d 698 (Ark. 1976); Vick v. Pioneer Oil Co., 569 S.W.2d 631 (Tx. Ct. App. 1978); Burns v.
Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972). But see Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th
Cir. 1972) (deferring to the EEOC Guidance and requiring the employer to pay its male employees
overtime pay in order to comply with both Title VII and state law requiring female employees to receive
overtime pay).
136

Homemakers, 356 F. Supp. at 1112-1113; Vick, 569 S.W.2d at 634; Burns, 346 F. Supp. at

997.
137

Of course, it is possible that the Court’s reading of congressional intent as supporting
extension itself reflects an implicit determination that a contrary reading of congressional intent would
violate equality law, and that the legislature should be presumed to act with the intent to act
constitutionally. But that is certainly not how the Court has explained what is doing.
138

This is especially true where the source of the equality guarantee is a federal statute, and the
underinclusive statute is a state statute. However, even if both the equality guarantee and the
discriminatory statute are at the same level in the hierarchy of law, it is still not clear why the legislature’s
intent with respect to how to remedy the discriminatory statute should prevail. At a minimum, where the
intent to permit only leveling down remedies conflicts with the intent to protect equality rights, such a
conflict would require a determination of which competing intent should prevail. Generally, the more
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3. External Limits Fixing the Level of Treatment for One Class
One settled limit that does constrain leveling down, again independent of any ties
to equality principles, is where the level of treatment for one group is fixed by some
external principle, so that a court can provide relief by equalizing benefits or burdens in a
single direction only.139 Thus, where the level of benefits for the favored class is fixed,
leveling up may be required as the only path to equal treatment. Of course, external
principles may work in the other direction too, precluding a court from raising the level
of treatment for the disfavored group.140
An example of the former situation, where leveling down is foreclosed, is found
in Welsh v. United States,141 a case most often cited for Justice Harlan’s observations
about the flexibility of equality in terms of possible remedies. In Welsh, the Court held
that the federal conscientious objector statute violated the establishment clause by
privileging religious opposition to war over non-religious belief systems. Rather than
striking down the conscientious objector statute in its entirety, the Court reversed the
conviction of the Petitioner, a nonreligious conscientious objector, thereby extending the
statute’s protection to the previously excluded group. Although the case was litigated
under the establishment clause and the Petitioner did not explicitly invoke an equality
claim, the Court engaged in the same kind of analysis as it does when it confronts an
underinclusive statute under the equal protection clause.142 However, in Welsh, the Court

specific and/or most recently expressed legislative intent prevails, but conflicts between legislative
intentions are notoriously difficult to resolve.
139

See Evan H. Caminker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95
YALE L.J. 1185, 1187 & n.8 (1986).
140

For example, in an equal protection challenge to a federal statute making citizenship automatic
for the foreign-born children of citizen-mothers but not citizen-fathers, Justice Scalia (concurring in the
judgment) observed that even if the Court had found an equal protection violation (it did not), it would not
have been able to extend citizenship to the challenger because only Congress, not the Court, has the power
to confer citizenship. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 453-59 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). If Scalia is
correct, the Court would have been precluded from imposing a leveling up remedy. But see Wauchope v.
United States Dept. of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding district court’s extension
of U.S. citizenship to foreign-born offspring of citizen-mothers in equal protection challenge to genderbased citizenship statute); Aguayo v. Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479, 486-88, 492 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (granting
citizenship to foreign-born daughter of citizen-mother as remedy for unconstitutional gender-based statute
conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizen-fathers but not citizen-mothers). For criticism of
the Court’s resolution of the equal protection challenge in Miller, see Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in
Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (discussing the majority’s reliance on gender stereotypes about
mens’ and womens’ parenting roles).
141

Welsh, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (“Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there
exist two remedial alternatives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend
to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend coverage of the statute to include those
who are aggrieved by exclusion.”) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and Iowa-Des
Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931)).
142

Id. at 356-57 (describing the Establishment Clause as embodying a “neutrality principle” which
requires an “‘equal protection mode of analysis’” to “eliminate…religious gerrymanders”); see also
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could not level down to resolve the disparity of treatment among religious and
nonreligious objectors, at least with respect to the Petitioner, because it could not
retroactively convict similarly situated religious conscientious objectors without violating
the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder.143 Thus, the extension of
conscientious objector status to Welsh was the only possible remedy.144 This limit, and
other possible limits grounded in due process, will typically prevent a court from
imposing a leveling down remedy in a criminal case where a convicted person seeks
relief in an equality claim.145 External limits derived from other (non-equality)
constitutional values also may limit leveling down remedies in civil cases.146
External principles that preclude leveling down choices also may have statutory
sources. Two federal antidiscrimination statutes in U.S. law contain provisions barring
remedies that would take away benefits from the favored class, thus requiring a leveling
up of remedies. Both the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
prohibit employers from lowering the wages of more highly paid workers in response to a
lawsuit alleging pay discrimination on the basis of protected class status against lowerpaid workers.147 These constraints were included in the legislation to mitigate concerns
about the costs of equality if it resulted in lowering the standard of living for those
privileged by inequality.148 As argued below, an understanding of equality that
transcends equal treatment may pose limits on leveling down. Currently, however, these

Michael Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 254 n.68 (1994)
(noting that the Establishment Clause “contains a miniature equal protection clause”).
143

398 U.S. 362.

144

If the action had been for prospective relief, such as a declaratory judgment, this constraint
would not have applied; the Court would have approached the question by looking at statutory intent, as it
does where underinclusive statutes are challenged under the equal protection clause. Id. at 364-366 & n.18
(Harlan, J., concurring).
145

Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (invalidating sex-based exclusion of nonvolunteer women from jury venire and ordering state to equally include both women and men in the jury
venire; because jury trials are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the inequality could only be cured by
including both men and women in the jury pool).
146

See, e.g., Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817-18 (1989) (state tax treating
retired state and local government employees differently from other retired employees violated equality
requirement of intergovernmental tax immunity, but federal court may not remedy the inequality by
increasing the tax burden on those treated more favorably because it lacks the constitutional power to
directly impose state taxes). See also Caminker, supra note 139, at 1185 (conceding that the constitutional
mandate of equal treatment does not itself dictate a preference for extending or withdrawing favorable
treatment as a remedy to inequality, but arguing that other constitutional norms may impose limits on such
a choice by courts).
147

See Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d)(1) (“an employer who is paying a wage rate
differential in violation [of the Act] shall not, in order to comply with the provisions [of the Act] reduce the
wage rate of any employee”); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (forbidding
employers to “reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter”).
148

See, e.g., 109 Cong. Rec. 9196 (1963) (the “lower wage rate must be increased to the higher
level so that there will not be an adverse effect on already established wage patterns”) (remarks of
Congressman Thompson).
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statutory constraints are understood as distinct from the equality guarantees in the
statutes.
Although external constraints may, sporadically, limit the incidence of leveling
down, they are few and far between, and they are not connected to any substantive value
in equality law. As a result, they are not a substitute for an analysis of whether, under
some circumstances, leveling down responses may conflict with equality principles
themselves.
4. Leveling Down as a Cover for Continuing Discrimination
There is one existing limit on leveling down, in addition to the discriminatory
intent standard discussed above, that does have its moorings in equality law. However, it
too falls short of providing an adequate account of leveling down in relation to equality
law. This limit comes into play when the “leveling down” does not actually lower the
level of treatment of everyone all the way down to the level of treatment of the most
disadvantaged. In such a case, the continuation of the discriminatory treatment violates
equality law. The Court in Palmer recognized the presence of ongoing, if obscured,
discrimination as a potential limit, although one that it thought not to be implicated in
Palmer itself: “If the time ever comes when Jackson attempts to run segregated public
pools either directly or indirectly, or participates in subterfuge whereby pools are
nominally run by ‘private parties’ but actually by the city, relief will be available in the
federal courts.”149 Several of the cases distinguished in Palmer can be understood as
falling within this exception. In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 150 the Court held that Prince Edward County’s decision to close its public
schools, rather than comply with a court desegregation order, violated the equal
protection clause. The Court explained its decision in Griffin as based on the
unconstitutional purpose of the county: to stop children from attending integrated
schools.151 However, in Palmer, which rejected an intent standard, the Court explained
Griffin as a case where the county was continuing, if covertly, to treat white students
preferentially, despite the façade of neutral treatment constructed by the closure of public
schools.152 This reading of Griffin finds support in the Court’s cases that treat state

149

Palmer, 403 U.S. at 223-24.

150

377 U.S. 218 (1964).

151

Id. at 231 (“But the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward’s schools
were closed and private schools operated in their place with state and county assistance, for one reason, and
one reason only: to ensure, through measures taken by the county and the State, that white and colored
children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the same school. Whatever
nonracial grounds might support a State’s allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be
a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”).
152

Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221-222 (explaining that the private schools in Prince Edward “were in
fact run by a practical partnership between State and county,” and that there were “many facets of state
involvement in the running of the ‘private schools.’”). See also id. at 225 (explaining Griffin as a case not
based on motive, but the reality that “the State was in fact perpetuating a segregated public school system
by financing segregated ‘private’ academies”).
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support of private discrimination as discrimination by the state.153 In other words, Griffin
was not a true leveling down case because the county continued to subsidize the
education of white students, who could attend publicly-subsidized “private” schools, but
did nothing for black students, who had no such schools to attend.
Unlike the other limits described above, this constraint is grounded in equality
law. Without a complete leveling down, the mandate of equal treatment is violated.
Because it is limited to fulfilling an equal treatment principle, however, it does not
impose any constraints in case where a complete leveling down of treatment has
occurred. If the county defendant in Griffin had truly leveled educational opportunities,
by playing no role in assisting white students to obtain a “private” education, it could
have avoided this check. The only remaining equality-based limit under existing doctrine
that could have challenged the school closure is the discriminatory intent standard, which
is an inadequate constraint on leveling down. Like the intent limit, the limit on partiallyleveling down assumes a narrow conception of equality that requires only equal treatment
and the absence of a discriminatory motive. It does not fully account for the ways in
which leveling down may perpetuate inequality.
D. Room for Further Development of Equality-Based Limits
Despite rumblings of doctrinal limits, courts typically approve leveling down with
minimal constraints, and the constraints that do exist are either unmoored from the
principles of equality law or grounded in an overly narrow and formalistic conception of
equality. As currently conceived, existing doctrine does not adequately account for the
ways in which leveling down can perpetuate and compound existing inequality. Still, the
Court has not foreclosed additional limits on leveling down that are grounded in a more
substantive conception of equality. As precedent, Palmer is a case that is sorely
outdated, its longevity due perhaps more to the Court’s reluctance to squarely overrule
prior cases than its continuing approval of the result in that case. Similarly, the Court’s
acceptance of the leveling down remedy in Mathews does not foreclose the rejection of
leveling down in other cases. Mathews accepted leveling down in a case where the injury
was limited to the differential treatment, and where the leveling down would not have
contributed to the social inequality of men or stigmatized them in relation to women.154
The Court’s interest in exploring potential limits, including the reference in Mathews to a
preference for extension rather than withdrawal of benefits in response to inequality,

153

See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state’s provision of textbooks to private
discriminatory schools violated equal protection); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court’s
enforcement of racially restrictive covenant violated equal protection). See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296, 302 (1966) (holding that Macon, Georgia could not transfer its city park from public to private hands
in order to avoid desegregation, because the city continued to maintain the park and thus was implicated by
the “private” park’s exclusion of African Americans); but see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970)
(affirming the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision that the trust given to Macon, Georgia in Senator Bacon’s
will failed after the Supreme Court’s decision in Evans v. Newton because the testator had clearly expressed
an intent that the park remain segregated, so that the land reverted to the state under Georgia state property
law, and would not be used as a public park).
154

The discussion also was hypothetical, occurring in the context of standing, as the Court
ultimately upheld the statutory classification on the merits.
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suggests that the Court may be amenable to further development of limits to leveling
down.
Nor does the shift to a discriminatory intent standard in Washington v. Davis155
foreclose a more searching inquiry into the potential tension between leveling down and
equality norms. At the point of evaluating a leveling down response, discrimination has
already occurred. The Court’s institutional concerns in Davis about frequent clashes with
other branches of government in reviewing countless policies with a disparate impact
should be less pressing once a violation of equal protection has been established. With
discriminatory intent (or facially different treatment) already having been established
once, leveling down in response to that discrimination deserves a more critical look, even
if proof of a discriminatory motive at this stage of the case is lacking.156 Once leveling
down enters the picture, the focus should be on whether it remedies the full extent of the
injuries cognizable under equality law.157 Nothing in Davis precludes a more critical
approach to leveling down as a remedy to inequality.
Although inadequately theorized, judicial expressions of dislike for leveling down
and fleeting efforts to limit it suggest the need for a closer look at the conventional
wisdom that inequality can always be remedied by leveling up or down. To begin a more
complete analysis of leveling down and its relationship to equality, we should revisit
whether equal treatment is indeed, as courts often assume, the only norm to be reckoned
with in equality law.

II.

A MORE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON LEVELING DOWN AND EQUALITY

An evaluation of the legitimacy of leveling down requires a more precise look at
the normative content of equality law and the injuries from which it protects.158
Although some injuries cognizable under equality law are of the equal treatment order,

155

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

156

In related contexts, once a violation of rights is established, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to prove that some other nondiscriminatory reason actually caused the harm to the plaintiff. See,
e.g., Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (once plaintiff shows that
exercise of rights was a “motivating factor” in decision not to rehire him, defendant has burden to prove
that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the plaintiff’s protected conduct); Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (amending Title VII so that once plaintiff proves
discrimination was a “motivating factor,” a violation is established, and defendant’s proof that it would
have taken the same decision anyway limits the remedy); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(once plaintiffs prove systemic disparate treatment, defendant has the burden of proof at the remedy stage
with respect to individual relief to show that any the harm to any particular plaintiff was not caused by
discrimination). An analogous rule here would be that once discrimination has been established, if the
defendant responds by leveling down, the defendant has the burden to prove the absence of a
discriminatory intent behind the leveling down action.
157

This should be the focus regardless of whether the underlying inequality has already been
ruled unlawful by a court. For example, if the leveling down occurs before the discrimination is
challenged, the plaintiff still should have the opportunity to prove that the underlying discrimination
violates equality law, and then that the leveling down response falls short of what equality law requires.
158

norm.”).

Cf. Gewirtz, supra note 30, at 585, 585 (“The function of a remedy is to ‘realize’ a legal
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others are not. The permissibility of leveling down should depend on its responsiveness
to the injuries of discrimination. Where the injury inheres in the materially dissimilar
treatment of persons otherwise similarly situated (a formal equality injury), it may be
remedied by eliminating the differential treatment either by leveling down, leveling up, or
settling a baseline at some point in between. However, where the injuries from
discrimination transcend the material consequences of differential treatment and are
social or relational in nature, leveling down may, depending on the social context,
exacerbate the injuries of discrimination and is not necessarily consistent with equality
law.
A. Equality as Equal Concern
What equality means depends on one’s perspective; there is no inherent meaning
that is discoverable in the equal protection clause or in statutes that broadly prohibit
discrimination based on certain criteria.159 With countless books, articles and essays
grappling with the meaning of equality, the purpose of the short discussion here is to
make the more limited point that equal treatment is not the only, nor even the most
predominant, norm in U.S. equality law. To be sure, equality law as it has developed in
the U.S. is concerned with the unequal treatment of persons deemed to be similarly
situated. The unequal treatment about which equality law is concerned includes both
different treatment and facially neutral treatment with a discriminatory purpose. The
latter type of treatment, although superficially treating persons the same, still involves an
equal treatment principle. The prohibition on discriminatory intent seeks to ensure the
equal treatment of persons in the decision-making process, so that they are not treated
less favorably than they would have been absent an impermissible reason.160 Thus, both
facially neutral classifications based on a discriminatory purpose and facially
discriminatory classifications violate an equal treatment principle unless they are
adequately justified by their relationship to a sufficiently weighty and acceptable purpose.
Although unequal treatment does, where insufficiently justified, violate equality
law, it does not follow that the normative content of equality law is fully exhausted by an
equal treatment mandate. Rather, when unequal treatment violates equality law, it is only
because it violates the more fundamental principle of equal concern. A wide variety of
scholars have identified the overriding norm of equality law as the principle that all
human beings deserve to be regarded with equal concern and respected as equals.161
159

Cf. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 107-108
(1976) (remarking upon the need for a mediating principle to add content to the equal protection clause).
160

As currently construed by the Court, the discriminatory intent requirement for facially neutral
treatment protects against certain kinds of animus in the decision-making process, such as race or sex bias.
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Personnell Adm’r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
161

See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, Forward: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6, 7 (1976) (explaining the antidiscrimination principle
as a prohibition on race-dependent decisions because of their propensity to “reflect the assumption that
members of one race are less worthy than other people,” and “are likely in fact to rest on assumptions of the
differential worth of racial groups”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1978)
(discussing equality in political morality as meaning not just equal treatment, but the more fundamental
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Perhaps the most well-known proponent of equal concern as the guiding normative
theory of equality is Ronald Dworkin.162 According to Dworkin, “the right to treatment
as an equal is fundamental, [while] the right to equal treatment [is] derivative.”163 In
other words, the right to be treated as an equal may not always require or be satisfied by
equal treatment. Where unequal treatment violates equality law, it does so not because
equality always requires treating people the same, but rather because the unequal
treatment in question violates the more fundamental principle of equal concern.164
Dworkin’s version of equal concern has been the subject of much commentary
and criticism, including by feminist scholars who have justly criticized it for positing a
neutral observer whose “concern” is dispassionate and arm’s length, and who implicitly
adopts the perspective of the persons in power who are obligated to exercise equal
concern, rather than the perspective of those who are the object of concern.165 However,
as a mediating principle, equal concern is broad enough to, and should, encompass a
more active and connected kind of concern, a concern that is empathetic and relational.166

principle of equal concern); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82 (1980) (embracing Dworkin’s equal
concern); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2000)
(discussing and elaborating a principle of equal concern as the guiding principle for deciding equal
protection cases); KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S EXPRESSION, LAW’S PROMISE: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER AND RELIGION, p. x (1993) (explaining his premise that legal guarantees of
equality in U.S. law are based on a principle of “equal citizenship,” such that “every individual is entitled to
be treated by the organized society as a respected and responsible participant”); ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 98 (1996) (identifying as the central theory of
antidiscrimination law, “the denial of the belief that some persons deserve less concern and respect because
of their race,” and subsequently applying this principle to gender and sexual orientation in addition to race);
Lawrence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063,
1072 (1980) (framing equality principle as “equal respect in which we as a society aspire to hold each
individual”).
162

See DWORKIN, supra note 161, at 272-73.

163

Id. at 227.

164

Id. at 273 (“… the right to treatment as an equal must be taken to be fundamental under the
liberal conception of equality, and … the more restrictive right to equal treatment holds only in those
special circumstances in which, for some special reason, it follows from the more fundamental right…”).
165

See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory: Does the
Constitution Deserve Our Fidelity: “Freedom from Unreal Loyalties”: On Fidelity in Constitutional
Interpretation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1773 (1997) (criticizing Dworkin’s theoretical approach to equality as
overly abstract and ungrounded in the lives of those who are subjected to inequality); Robin West,
Forward: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 69, 71-72, 75-76 (1990) (criticizing Dworkin
for contributing to an “atomistic focus on rights” and an “insulation” of the persons claiming rights, such
that citizens are constructed with “almost none of the so-called ‘civic virtues’: mercy, compassion, public
involvement, fellow-feeling, sympathy, or, simply, love”); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE 151-52, 194 (1990) (critiquing legal liberalism for regarding persons as separate and
autonomous individuals instead of in the context of social relationships).
166

See, e.g., Linda McClain, Atomistic Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1219-1219-20, 1223-25 (1992) (arguing that Dworkin’s equal
concern has been given an overly narrow and atomistic reading in some feminist criticism, and that equal
concern “is not myopic with regard to differences among people and their needs,” that it “combines notions
of both reciprocity and response,” and that it is sensitive to community membership in determining
obligations and responsibilities).
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Rather than defining equal concern from the perspective of a neutral actor who is
obligated to act with equal concern, an enlarged perspective should include that of the
persons for whom the obligation attaches.167 Equal concern should value the connections
between people, not just their interests as atomistic individuals.168 It should insist upon
an openness to forming connections with persons as equal members of a shared
community, and take responsibility for relational injuries to persons’ self-conceptions,
following Patricia Williams’ instruction to account for the damage that occurs when we
disregard those persons whose “lives qualitatively depend on our regard.”169 Under such
a reading, equal concern does not allow those in power to sever some persons from the
community or devalue them for their differences.170 In short, equal concern should
include an obligation to act with equal empathy for our shared humanity, rather than a
dispassionate weighing of the interests of abstracted individuals from the perspective of
those doing the weighing. It is this view of equal concern that I endorse here.
Such a reconstruction of equality law is perhaps not so far from existing law as
one might suppose. The Court’s own case law leaves room for an equality that is larger
than equal treatment, one that is grounded in an equal concern based on respect and
empathy for persons as members of a shared community. As a starting point, the Court’s
justifications of its most revered equal protection rulings support the conclusion that the
constitutional guarantee of equality is, at bottom, about more than equal treatment. In
Brown v. Board of Education itself, the Court rejected state-enforced racial segregation,
notwithstanding its (far-fetched and hypothetical) assumption of tangible equality, in
language that places equal concern at the forefront of an equal protection analysis.171
Similarly, in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court spoke of the state’s exclusion of
African Americans from jury service as “a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an
assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an

167

Id. at 1220 (interpreting Dworkin’s equal concern as incorporating a perspective in which “one
does not merely substitute oneself for the other but engages in perspective taking that attempts to see the
other in the other’s own terms”).
168

Cf. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987)
(seeking to reconstruct rights as sensitive to social relationships and community membership, rather than as
instruments held by atomistic, insular individuals).
169

Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law’s Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 151 (1987). See also Seyla Benhabib, The
Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory, in WOMEN
AND MORAL THEORY 148, 164, 169 (E. Kittay & D. Meyers eds., 1987) (defining an equal concern
principle that makes each “entitled to expect and to assume from the other forms of behavior through which
the other feels recognized and confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents,
capacities”).
170

See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 291, 365-69 (1985) (formulating a feminist account of equal respect that does not ignore or
trivialize persons’ differences, but refuses to attach normative significance to them).
171

Brown v. Board of Education, of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.).
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impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others.”172 And in Loving v. Virginia, the Court looked beyond the state’s
facially symmetrical prohibition on interracial marriage to see it as a “measure…designed
to maintain White Supremacy.”173
The Court’s more recent equality decisions also give voice to an equal concern
principle. For example, the Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans might stand for the
principle that the state must respond to the needs of gay and lesbian persons with equal
concern.174 The Court viewed Colorado’s Amendment to its state constitution, which
prohibited local governments from enacting antidiscrimination measures guarding against
sexual orientation discrimination, as an expression of unequal concern.175 Even more
recently, last Term’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas176 reads like an equal protection case
dressed up in due process garb, with the value of equal concern showing up prominently
in admonitions about the need for gays and lesbians to “retain their dignity as free
persons,” and the recognition that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek
autonomy for these purposes just as heterosexual persons do.”177 The Court explicitly
suggested a linkage between its due process reasoning in Lawrence and the values
implicated by the equal protection clause:
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both
interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so
remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain
even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.178
Although the Court used the terminology of equal treatment, the underlying value
protected was one of equal concern and respect, with attention to the state’s role in
fomenting prejudice by others.
This principle of equal concern may be violated even without facially different
treatment or proof of a conscious discriminatory intent. Selective empathy and
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100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1880).

173

388 U.S. 1 (1967).

174

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

175

Id. at 634-35.

176

Lawrence v. Texas, No. 02-102, slip op. (June 26, 2003).

177

Id. at 6, 13.

178

Id. at 14.
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indifference can violate equal concern as much as an intentionally discriminatory act.179
The Court’s stricter formulations of the discriminatory intent standard notwithstanding, it
has periodically recognized that acting out of stereotypes or unconscious bias is a form of
disparate treatment that violates equality guarantees.180 In the equal protection context,
the Court settled on an intent standard not so much because it set the limits or scope of
the constitutional equality, but rather for institutional reasons, to avoid what it perceived
would be incessant clashes with other branches and levels of government under an
alternative discriminatory effects standard.181 And even in the equal protection context,
the intent standard is not always applied strictly.182
Understanding why equality law concerns itself with unequal treatment at all
requires us to look deeper at the content of equality. Why are some kinds of unequal
treatment unobjectionable while others are more suspect? As American law has
developed, unequal treatment is generally only problematic when it is based on
characteristics that signal likely bias without a legitimate basis for penalizing people.183
Thus, race, sex, and increasingly, sexual orientation, are more suspect as bases for
unequal treatment than height, intelligence, line-of-work, income, or other personal and
social characteristics. While there is a vast quantity of literature attempting to make
sense of why some classes but not others are treated as suspect for equal protection
purposes, a common understanding is that the criteria selected for higher scrutiny reflect
179

See Brest, supra note 161, at 1, 7-8 (contending that selective empathy and indifference, and
not just conscious animus, violates equal concern).
180

See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Nevada Dept. of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (treating worker leave policies that are premised on stereotypes
about the allocation of family duties between men and women as a form of sex-based discrimination by
employers in violation of the fourteenth amendment).
181

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (drawing the line at discriminatory intent
out of concern that an alternative discriminatory effects standard would “raise serious questions about, and
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes”);
Strauss, supra note 48, at 935, 954-56 (contending that Washington v. Davis “tamed” Brown by cutting
short the scope of the equal protection principle in deference to the Court’s fears of getting more deeply
enmeshed in policing inequality). See also Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (explaining that, for institutional reasons, courts do
not always accord the full normative scope of legal guarantees and distinguishing between the content of
the law and the extent to which a court is willing to enforce it).
182

See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1998) (arguing that the
stringency of the intent requirement in equal protection cases varies significantly by context); Daniel Ortiz,
The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989) (arguing that in contexts where
liberal political theory permits nonmarket allocations, such as voting, jury selection, and sometimes
education, a strict intent standard is not applied as a serious requirement in equal protection challenges).
183

Of course, equal concern does not require that all persons be accorded equal respect, regardless
of their actions. Cf. Connecticut Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003) (holding that
Connecticut’s sex offender registry requirement did not violate due process when the public registry
requirement was based on prior conviction and not current or future propensity for dangerousness). Rather,
it requires a substantive theory about what kinds of identities must be equally respected. When grounded in
democratic theory, it would make sense that equal concern should equally respect those aspects of identity
that are central to personhood and autonomy, so as to enable people to make the kinds of choices that
further their development as human beings with the responsibility for self-governance.
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the Court’s judgment that these classifiers correspond to the kind of systemic
disadvantaging and unjustified discrimination likely to indicate a violation of equal
concern.184 Without reference to a norm of equal concern, equal treatment would not
make sense as a guiding theory, as it would have nothing to say about which types of
equal treatment are more suspect than others. If equal treatment alone were the guiding
principle, equality law would be an ahistoric mandate about consistency in applying the
correct rules of decision to all similarly situated persons.
As further proof that equal treatment is not coextensive with constitutional or
statutory guarantees of equality, these guarantees sometimes permit different treatment,
and occasionally even require something more than mere identical treatment. An
example of the former comes from the Court’s decision last Term upholding race-based
affirmative action at the University of Michigan Law School. In Grutter v. Bollinger,185
the Court upheld the University’s policy permitting the limited use of race in admissions
decisions against an equal protection challenge. To begin the equal protection analysis,
the Court made an uncharacteristically emphatic statement about the importance of
context: “[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the
Equal Protection Clause.”186 The context that mattered especially in that case included
how the university used diversity and why it was important to do so. In upholding the
plan, the Court emphasized the role of racial diversity in producing cultural
transformation: it “promotes ‘cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and ‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.’”187
In other words, it fosters, rather than undermines, the precept of equal concern. Although
the O’Connor opinion made reference to a “norm of equal treatment,” in emphasizing the
importance of time limits to protect the equal protection rights of non-beneficiaries of the
program, overall her opinion defies such a limited understanding of the scope of the equal
protection principle. Indeed, even the reference to equal treatment as an underlying norm
reveals a larger and overriding norm embodied within equality law:
The requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have a
termination point ‘assure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of
equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a
measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.’188
Thus, “equality itself” must be about something larger than equal treatment. While the
Michigan plan could be said to violate a principle of equal treatment, it did not violate the

184

See, e.g., Holly Dyer, Gender-Based Affirmative Action: Where Does it Fit in the Tiered
Scheme of Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 41 KAN. L. REV. 591, 595 (1993) (explaining that the Court justifies
the tiered system of scrutiny on a theory of group treatment where the group lacks access to the political
process and has historically been subjected to discrimination).
185

Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 02-241, slip op. (June 23, 2003).

186

Id. at 15.

187

Id. at 17-18.

188

Id. at 30-31 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 510).
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more fundamental norm of equal concern. In Grutter, the overarching principle of equal
concern that animated the opinion was relational, recognizing the interdependence of
persons of all races, and encouraging shared responsibility for correcting racism, and the
benefits to all in doing so. The Court has taken a similar approach to statutory
prohibitions on discrimination, allowing departures from equal treatment in the service of
the more fundamental principle of equal concern.189
Likewise, the Court has justified its selection of strict scrutiny for race-based
affirmative action with reference to a norm of equal concern, stating that strict scrutiny is
necessary to ensure that a racial classification is truly benign and not based on
“illegitimate notions of racial inferiority.”190 Although strict scrutiny as applied to racial
affirmative action may be (and is, in my view) a very poor proxy for a norm of equal
concern, its use does not prove that the equal protection principle has been reduced to
formally equal treatment.
Not only does equality law permit departures from equal treatment in service of
equality, it may sometimes require more than the same treatment. Equal concern may
sometimes forbid formally equal treatment where it gives effect to, or exacerbates, an
expression of unequal concern towards some persons by others. The celebrated (if
puzzled over) equal protection cases of Shelle y v. Kramer,191 Palmore v. Sidoti,192 and
Loving v. Virginia193 can be understood as cases where formally similar treatment did not
satisfy equal protection. In Shelley , the state claimed to treat all persons the same in
enforcing private racially restrictive covenants;194 in Palmore, the state could claim that it
treated all parents the same in avoiding custodial decisions that would subject children to
prejudice or other harm against their best interests;195 and in Loving, the state claimed
that it treated African American and white citizens alike in forbidding their intermarriage.196 The Court saw through each of these claims of formally similar treatment,
striking down each state’s action because it gave further expression to whites’ racism and
unequal concern for African Americans. Romer v. Evans197 continues this rejection of
formally equal treatment. Colorado had prohibited any person, straight or gay, from

189

See, e.g., California Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (holding that
Pregnancy Discrimination Act did not prohibit state statute granting a limited right to unpaid leave and
reinstatement for pregnant workers but not for other workers temporarily disabled from working, and that
PDA did not require equal treatment in all instances, but set “’a floor beneath which pregnancy disability
benefits may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise.’”); Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616 (1987) (permitting limited affirmative action program benefiting women under Title VII).
190

Adarand Contractors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).

191

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

192

466 U.S. 429 (1984).

193

388 U.S. 1 (1967).

194

Shelley, 334 U.S. at 21.

195

Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431.

196

Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8.
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517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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obtaining protection from sexual orientation discrimination through the normal political
process.198 The Court easily dismissed the state’s claim to formally neutral treatment,
finding a clear message of inferiority and a lack of equal concern for gay and lesbian
persons.199 In each of these cases, equal concern required more than mere formal
equality; it required the state to avoid otherwise neutral actions that gave added effect to
private prejudice.200
Even disparate impact law—currently most prominent in Title VII litigation201—
may be understood as a doctrine that serves as a proxy for unequal concern. The
selection of qualifications that have a markedly disparate impact without a sufficient
relationship to job performance give reason to suspect selective empathy or indifference
to the group that is disproportionately affected, a violation of equal concern.202 Although
disparate impact is not a proxy that the Court has adopted in the equal protection context,
largely for institutional reasons, the use of disparate impact doctrine in limited statutory
contexts suggests that the specific rules giving teeth to an equal concern norm may
exceed an admonition to treat likes alike.
The goal here is not to spell out the full content of an equal concern principle, or
even to argue that it is the best or only plausible interpretation of legal equality

198

Id. at 629.

199

Id. at 635.

200

See KOPPELMAN, supra note 161, at 24-31, 43-47 (arguing that anti-discrimination law must
address the government’s role in furthering the cultural bias of supposedly private actors in order to ensure
that the outcomes of the democratic process comply with a norm of equal concern).
201

Disparate impact is not actionable under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Disparate impact was first recognized as a basis for liability in the statutory
context in Title VII litigation, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1991 Civil Rights Act, amending Title VII), and was subsequently incorporated into
various other antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S. C. § 12112(b)(3), (6) (Americans with
Disabilities Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), (b) (Voting Rights Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Fair Housing
Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Equal Credit Opportunity Act). By judicial interpretation, disparate impact claims
are not actionable under certain other antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g., Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275 (2001) (Title VI regulations); General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)
(42 U.S.C. § 1981); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1983). Under certain
other antidiscrimination statutes, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, the fate of disparate impact doctrine remains uncertain. See, e.g., Adams
v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that disparate impact theory is not
available under the ADEA), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1054 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
535 U.S. 228 (2002); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA); Katherine Connor & Ellen J. Vargyas, The Legal
Implications of Gender Bias in Standardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 13, 42-43 (1992)
(arguing that Title IX, unlike Title VI, is not necessarily limited to the reach of the equal protection clause
and should encompass disparate impact claims).
202

See Krieger, supra note 48, at 1251, 1293-98 (discussing how cognitive bias unintentionally
affects selection of qualifications for measuring “merit”).
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guarantees.203 Rather, my agenda is to show that, descriptively, equality law embraces
the principle of equal concern, and to seek to hold the law to its promise.204
Once equal concern is understood as the animating principle of equality law,
leveling down no longer fits so comfortably with equality law. The assumption that
leveling down adequately remedies inequality is based on a narrow understanding of
equality as equal treatment. If equality law requires equal concern and not just equal
treatment, leveling down requires closer scrutiny. In some circumstances, leveling down
may represent the antithesis of equal concern, a refusal to connect or to broaden the
boundaries of community to share its privileges. Such a determination requires further
study of the expressive meaning of leveling down and attention to its social context.
B. An Expressive Meaning Approach to Leveling Down
If equal concern is the guiding principle of equality law, actions that signal or
express unequal concern become problematic. Recent scholarship on the expressive
dimension of law and other government action demonstrates that the expressive meaning
of an action is critical in determining whether it comports with the normative
requirements of the governing law.205 The expressive meaning of an action exists wholly
apart from its material consequences.206 Even if leveling down treats everyone the same
in material respects, it may express selective disdain or disregard for some persons. In
some contexts, leveling down may reproduce inequality through its expressive meaning,
in violation of equal concern.
Like many actions, leveling down the more favored treatment in response to
inequality contains a social meaning (used here interchangeably with “expressive
meaning”).207 If an action may be understood as a text, then the social meaning of an
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See generally Robin West, Symposium on Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Equality
and the Interpretive Turn, 66 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 451 (1990) (acknowledging that Constitutional
guarantees of equality, like any text, require interpretation, and discussing various constraints on such
interpretation).
204

Cf. MacKinnon, supra note 165, at 1773, 1775 (discussing the relationship between legal
guarantees of equality and constitutional legitimacy, and seeking to “hold the Constitution to its promise,
for the first time if necessary”).
205

See, e.g., Andrew Altman, Expressive Meaning, Race, and the Law: The Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 5 LEGAL THEORY 75 (1999); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Hellman, supra
note 161; Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard
Pildes & Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating ElectionDistrict Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 2021 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); see also Lawrence, supra note 49 (proposing a “cultural
meaning” test for determining equal protection violations).
206

See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 205, at 1527, 1531, 1542 (explaining that an action may
have an expressive meaning that is harmful, regardless of the material consequences of that action).
207

See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 205, at 951 n.20 (noting the similarity between Lessig’s definition
of social meaning and Pildes’ discussion of the “expressive dimension” of action; Sunstein, supra note 205,
at 925 (describing social meaning as the expressive dimension of conduct in a relevant community, a
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action is the product of a combination of text and context, or “the collection of
understandings or expectations shared by some group at a particular time and place.”208
The expressive meaning of an action is socially constructed, and heavily dependent on
context.209 Relevant features of context include how an act is understood in light of
surrounding social practices, how it is justified, and how it will be perceived and
understood by those persons affected by it.210 As with much interpretation, there is no
single, unambiguous social meaning for any given action; interpretive choices are
required. Yet, the need for interpretation does not mean that any action is open to an
endless and unlimited set of possible social meanings.211
If leveling down expresses unequal concern, it should be understood as
incompatible with the mandate of equality law. Expressive meaning matters, and should
matter, in an equality analysis.212 Satisfying the normative content of equality law
requires that the actions of those actors governed by the law express norms consistent
with equal concern.213 The social meaning of an action may inflict expressive harms that

product of social norms, context and culture). Although most actions do have social meaning, some actions
have little or no social meaning. Among the latter classes of actions, Lessig gives the example of a man
turning over in his sleep. Id. at 954.
208

See Lessig, supra note 205, at 958. Lessig further defines “social meaning” as “the semiotic
content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context.” Id. at 951. As he
explains, these actions “have associations with other actions, or meanings, and these associations are
constitutive of what I am calling their semiotic content.” Id. at 954.
209

See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 205, at 1525. Lessig gives examples of tipping and flying
the confederate flag as actions which have a particular, context-dependent social meaning. Lessig, supra
note 205, at 952-54.
210

Andrew Altman, for example, contends that the social meaning of an action depends on four
criteria: “(1) the motives or traits of character that explain an act; (2) the constitutive social roles and
practices in terms of which an act is understood; (3) the ways in which the act can best be justified by those
seeking to defend it; and (4) the causal consequences of the act for those affected by it, insofar as those
consequences are mediated by perception of one or more of (1)-(3).” Altman, supra note 205, at 77.
211

See Lessig, supra note 205, at 955 (“[e]ven if there is no single meaning, there is a range or
distribution of meanings, and the question … is how that range gets made, and more importantly,
changed.”).
212

See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 205, at 1533-45 (arguing that modern equal protection
law is best understood as regulating expressive harm, in the sense that the Court views the expressive
meaning of government action as critical to its constitutionality); Hellman, supra note 161, at 13-18
(arguing that the core value of equal protection is to protect against state action that expresses a message of
unequal concern). Cf. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 118, 1210-113 (1989) (arguing that sexual harassment should be unlawful if it
conveys a dismissive message that devalues women as employees).
213

See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 205, at 1508-1510; see also Sunstein, supra note 205, at
2049 (contending that government action enforcing a norm of women as domestic caregivers would violate
equal protection because it conflicts with the requirement of equal concern); Pildes & Niemi, supra note
205, at 506-511 (explaining Shaw v. Reno as a vindication of a theory of expressive harms); Altman, supra
note 205, at 80-99 (agreeing that the Court did, and should have, tested the government action in Shaw v.
Reno under an expressive harms theory, but disagreeing with the Court’s interpretation of the expressive
message in Shaw, since the district could have been justified as a response to the recognition that private
prejudice reduces minority voting strength, so as to be consistent with equal concern).
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are cognizable, and the refusal to acknowledge another as an equal violates the
requirements of equal concern even if unaccompanied by tangible differences in
treatment. This understanding of equal protection is consistent with the animating
principle of Brown v. Board of Education, that the state’s segregation violated equal
protection because it expressed a message of racial inferiority violated.214
Equality claims are largely about challenges to existing social meaning and the
reconstruction of social relationships based on changes in social meaning.215 The current
debate over same-sex marriage and the social meaning of “marriage” starkly illustrates
this point. Expressive meaning plays an important part in the process of negotiating
social relations. Expressions of regard or disregard toward persons construct the social
relationships between them, as “social relations are partially constituted by mutual
acknowledgement of the terms on which people are relating to one another.”216 Since
social meaning is always being constructed, equality claims that successfully challenge
existing social meaning have the potential to forge new social relationships based on new
social meanings.217
The challenge to existing social meaning can set in motion what Professor Larry
Lessig has termed “a defensive construction of social meaning,” actions seeking to
Professor Lessig uses the enactment of
preserve existing social meanings.218
antimiscegenation laws in response to the abolition of slavery and attacks on Jim Crow as
an example of how communities engage in the defensive construction of social meaning:
A social meaning is challenged by an emerging practice, and to preserve
the old meaning, the emerging practice is prohibited or opposed. This
resistance is a kind of social meaning construction because it aims to resist
what would otherwise be an evolving social meaning. It “changes” the
social meaning because but for the intervention, the meaning would
become something else. Thus …whites resist intermarriage to preserve the
loyalty and sensibility of “whiteness.”219
214

This is essentially the view of Brown taken by Professor Charles Black in his classic defense of
the decision See Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427
(1960) (describing “the social meaning of segregation” as “putting the Negro in a position of walled-off
inferiority”). Taking a similar approach, Professors Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes argue that the
Court’s much-criticized use of social science data in Brown to show the negative effects on African
American children was beside the point; the expression of inferiority was itself a constitutionally
recognized harm, regardless of the tangible consequences. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 205, at 1542-43.
215

See, e.g., Ross, supra note 50, at 16-17 & n.55 (1990) (in discussing legal rhetoric of race in
Plessy v. Ferguson, quoting passages from the plaintiffs’ briefs describing the Louisiana segregation law as
“amount[ing] to a taunt by law of that previous condition of their class [slavery]—a taunt by the State, to
be administered with perpetually repeated like taunts in word…”) (emphasis in original).
216

Anderson & Pildes, supra note 205, at 1550.

217

See Lessig, supra note 205, at 962 (explaining that “social construction proceeds by breaking
up the understandings or associations at a particular time or built into a relatively uncontested context and
upon which social texts have meaning.”).
218

Id. at 987.

219

Id. at 991.
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One social meaning that is often contested in equality claims is the status of
persons who are members of certain social groups.220 When an equality claim challenges
existing status hierarchies and the social meanings that have held them in place, struggles
over status ensue. Once social groups that have been ranked lower in social status
achieve some success in narrowing the status hierarchy, the response by higher-status
groups is often a “rearguard” effort to reassert traditional hierarchies in other ways, or to
use Lessig’s terminology, a defensive construction of social meaning.221
An application of the defensive construction of social meaning is readily apparent
in the leveling down context. When an equality claim is asserted and successful (at least
in establishing a violation), the existing social meaning is threatened and in danger of
being replaced by a new understanding of social relationships. In such a case, leveling
down may effectively thwart such changes by excluding the challengers from what was
previously valued, and by expressing a preference for losing the benefit rather than
broadening the community of persons sharing in it. Thus, the separateness and social
inequality of challenger and challenged is preserved. For example, Cazares’ challenge to
the school board contested the social meaning of pregnancy and unwed motherhood, and
at the same time questioned the community’s expectations of honor students, and even
the definition of “honor” itself. In response to this challenge to existing social meaning,
the school board engaged in a defensive construction of social meaning, reasserting its
definition of honor as one which excludes young women like Cazares.
As a defensive construction of social meaning, leveling down may be understood
as a practice that perpetuates social stratification.222 Equality law, which strives to
regulate the social practices that sustain group inequality, has often failed to account for
the ways in which the practices and meanings that sustain group inequality evolve as they

220

In speaking of social groups, I do not mean to imply that such groupings are in any way
inherent or static; rather, I use the term to signify the social reality that in the United States, at this time and
historically, certain markers of identity, including race, sex, and sexual orientation, are socially significant
in that they both affect the self-constructed identities of persons who share them and are given social
significance by outsiders. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHIKENT L. REV. 687, 703 (2000) (“The fact that reality is a social construction does not mean that it is not
there; it means that it is there, in society, where we live.”).
221

See Jack M. Balkin, Symposium, Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and
Religion: The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2335 (1997). On the other hand, Jack Balkin
explains that when status hierarchies are rigid and largely unchallenged, those advantaged by them can
afford to blur the lines somewhat between lower and higher status groups without jeopardizing their
position. Id. at 2333. This leads to what Professor Balkin terms the “paradox of status hierarchy”: that
societies with relatively rigid status hierarchies “tend to appear relatively stable and peaceful on the
surface.” Id. at 2333, 2334.
222

See Reva Siegel, 1998-99 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture: Discrimination in the Eyes of
the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 77, 77-78 (2000) [hereinafter Siegel, Discrimination] (defining social stratification as the status
inequality among social groups that arises out of the interaction of social structure (social institutions or
practices) and social meaning); see also Reva Siegel, The Critical Use of History: Why Equal Protection
No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997)
[hereinafter Siegel, The Critical Use of History].
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are contested.223 Because discrimination is a social practice that evolves over time and
has no fixed form, discriminatory social practices can be expected over time to assume
more accepted forms as their legitimacy is contested.224 To borrow a term from Reva
Siegel, leveling down may be understood as a form of “preservation-throughtransformation” that, depending on the social and historic context in which it occurs, may
serve to sustain social stratification despite (and perhaps even because of) its
abandonment of differential treatment.225 By preserving the unequal status relationships
that were previously enforced by differential treatment, leveling down may simply
represent a transformation in the form of, rather than a rejection of, the discriminatory
practice that it replaces. In a case like Palmer, for example, leveling down serves the
same function as the prior segregation: it perpetuates social hierarchy and racial
separation by preventing whites and blacks from sharing city pools as equals. The shift
to a facially neutral form should not obscure the role that leveling down plays in the
continued enforcement of social stratification.226
In the contest over social meaning, part of the power of leveling down comes
from its assertion of the privilege to change the rules and shift the terrain on which
equality is negotiated. Implicit in leveling down is the determination that the benefit that
had been allocated unequally suddenly has become unworthy of preservation if it must be
shared on equal terms with those previously excluded. One example of how efforts to
achieve equality can lead to shifts in the value of what is pursued, thus reproducing
inequality, comes from the experience of efforts to integrate the workforce. When
marginalized groups enter the ranks of previously exclusive professions, it often results in
the devaluation of the field, rather than meaningful equality in the workforce. As Martha
Chamallas has explained, “‘gains’ in integrating occupations can be easily offset by
counter-trends, including the reconfiguration of jobs ... The net result may be that even as
women successfully enter formerly male-dominated fields, they remain disadvantaged as
workers relative to men.”227 As a form of leveling down, this example illustrates how
redefinitions of value can operate to preserve inequality.

223

See Siegel, Discrimination, supra note 222
, at 78 (stating that “a commitment to alleviating
stratification is and has been central to the project of antidiscrimination law since the beginning of the
Second Reconstruction.”).
224

Siegel, The Critical Use of History, supra note 222, at 1113 (arguing that after Jim Crow was
challenged and defeated, it was replaced by new practices and principles such as the trope of colorblindness
and the intent requirement that have sustained new social practices that preserve much of the prior
stratification); id. at 1142 (noting that “status enforcing state action is mutable in form”).
225

See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2178-87 (1996) [hereinafter Siegel, “The Rule of Love”].
226

See generally CHAMALLAS, supra note 6 (discussing feminist legal scholarship on the
reproduction of dominance, and discussing how changes can occur without altering basic gender
hierarchies, or, “the more things change, the more they stay the same”).
227

Id. at 10-11. See also Marina Angel, The Glass Ceiling for Women in Legal Education:
Contract Positions and the Death of Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (2000) (discussing research showing that
the entry of more women into the legal academy has coincided with a shift away from tenure and toward
short- term contracts and lower status jobs).
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The potential for leveling down to affect social status and social meaning, thereby
preserving existing social arrangements, helps explain why persons in power may be
willing to impose some material cost on themselves in order to stave off attacks on the
social order. Social groups compete not just for material rewards and resources, but also
for status.228 For example, work by critical race scholars demonstrating a property
interest in race shows the importance of social status in determining a social group’s
welfare. As e. christi cunningham explains, persons whose racial identities are
subsidized by the state accumulate “identity capital.”229 Status, or identity capital, plays a
key role in maintaining a group’s social position. Status inequality between groups is
sustained by a system of social meanings that assigns one group relatively positive
associations and another correspondingly negative ones.230 Because the status of social
groups is relational, status hierarchies create zero sum games, in that a change in the
meanings associated with one social group affects the relative positioning of another.231
The significance of social status explains why groups at the top of a status
hierarchy may be willing to impose some material cost on members of their own group in
order to preserve a status hierarchy. In competition among social groups, status is
important for its own sake, wholly apart from whatever material goods are attached to
status at a given moment.232 Symbols and social meaning, not just material resources,
determine the status of competing social groups. In fact, a group’s relative social power
may be more important even than its pecuniary resources in advancing its social
position.233 Consequently, a material loss is not a sufficient deterrent to persons who
discriminate against others at some cost to themselves for the sake of relational gains in
status.234 As long as the expressive message is one that supports the existing hierarchy,

228

See Balkin, supra note 221, at 2326. For a discussion of how law helps constitute status and
social roles, see Sunstein, supra note 205, at 923. See also Richard Y. Bourhis, Power, Gender, and
Intergroup Discrimination: Some Minimal Group Experiments, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: THE
ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, vol. 7, 171 -208, at 173, 201 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assocs., 1994) (discussing social
power as determined by “the degree of control that one group has over its fate and that of outgroups”).
229

See e. christi cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491, 507 (2002); see also Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
230

See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 221, at 2323. While Professor Balkin recognizes that the status of
individuals within a group varies widely, he focuses on that component of status that is identified with
membership in a social group. Id. at 2321-22.
231

See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1031 (1995); see also cunningham, supra
note 229, at 512 (“[i]n identity markets, the value of any particular racial identity is measured against the
value of all other racial identities in the market.”).
232

See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative
Action, 82 B.U.L. REV. 1089, 1100-1105 (2002).
233

See Bourhis, supra note 228, at 171, 195. See also Adams, supra note 232, at 1089, 1102-1103
(discussing research on social identity theory showing that individuals tend to engage in discriminatory
behavior that advances their social group even when they do not stand to gain directly from the
discriminatory behavior, if the discrimination enhances the status of their social group).
234

See JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIO PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF
SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 18-19 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (discussing research an social
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the loss of benefits to the advantaged group may not be a sufficient deterrent to leveling
down when it functions as a practice that enforces status hierarchy.
Indeed, leveling down may be a particularly effective way to enforce status
hierarchies for the very reason that the higher status group has deprived itself of a
material benefit in order to preserve existing status differentials. Where the leveling
down signals a refusal to share resources or benefits with a lower status social group, the
action may be understood as a defensive effort to fight off challenges to the boundaries of
social group identity.235 The deprivation of the benefit to the socially advantaged group
may make the across-the-board denial of benefits especially effective toward this end.
Insults to social groups are particularly effective when they do not otherwise coincide
with the self-interest of the group imposing the insult.236 Thus, the material cost of
leveling down is part of what makes it an effective means of signaling low esteem. The
refusal to share benefits on equal terms—precisely because it comes with the cost of
denying benefits to the in-group—may be even more effective in preserving status
inequality than outright differential treatment.237 This account demonstrates the fallacy
of Justice Jackson’s faith in the political process as an adequate check on the unjustified
extension of burdens to members of the majority. Justice Jackson’s account fails to
acknowledge the importance of status in maintaining social arrangements that privilege
majority group members.
In addition to its importance in maintaining status hierarchies and social
inequality, attention to the social meaning of leveling down is important for another
reason as well. When the expressive force of law and other government action shapes
social meaning, this influence on social meaning may affect individual and collective
behavior wholly apart from the sanctions of law enforcement.238 Law and other
government actions play a role in “norm management,” functioning to encourage shifts in

identity theory showing the tendancy of persons to make allocation decisions that maximize status
differentials favoring their own social group, even at some material costs to their own social group);
McAdams, supra note 231, at 1063 (“the discriminator does bear a cost in discriminating—forgoing
otherwise beneficial trade with the objects of the discrimination—but that cost is an investment in the
production of status”).
235

Cf. cunningham, supra note 229, at 497-514 (explaining how, historically, maintaining
property value in race and racial identity markets has depended on the state’s role in policing the
boundaries of race as a meaningful social category).
236

McAdams, supra note 231, at 1048 (1995) (discussing research showing that insults to other
groups are particularly effective where they do not otherwise coincide with the self-interest of the
competing social group).
237

Professor McAdams makes this argument with respect to discrimination generally, since the
discriminator foregoes market efficiency for the benefit of enhancing his or her own group-status. As he
explains: “By definition, the discriminator makes a material sacrifice (giving up an otherwise favorable
trade or engaging in costly behavior) as a means of lowering the status of the victim.” Id. at 1076.
Leveling down imposes a distinct material deprivation in addition to whatever sacrifice the discriminator
makes in carrying out the underlying discrimination.
238

For example, Professor Sunstein argues that laws against littering shape social norms against
littering and thereby influence behavior even when violations are not punished through the legal process.
See Sunstein, supra note 205, at 2030.
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social norms.239 To the extent that law shapes norms through its expressive force,
equality law’s uncritical acceptance of leveling down as a remedy to inequality has the
potential to undermine the construction of equality norms and their power to shape
behavior. If antidiscrimination law seeks to enforce a social norm of equal concern and
respect, then the acceptance of leveling down when it signals a lack of equal concern may
dilute the expressive force of the equal concern norm.240 By accepting a conflicting
message at the end-stage of an equality claim, the overriding “take-home” message may
be one of unequal concern for the group challenging the inequality. To the extent that
law’s role in shaping social norms affects behavior, we may expect additional
expressions of unequal concern, as the social norm favoring equal concern is
weakened.241 If a primary project of anti-discrimination law is to end the state’s
encouragement of private discrimination and cultural bias, then equality law should not
permit leveling down when it undercuts that agenda.242
The few limits on leveling down under existing law do not begin to recognize
adequately the extent to which leveling down may implicate the very concerns which
equality law purports to address. Doctrinal efforts focused on the significance of the
benefit, remedial principles favoring extension, and a fixed level of treatment for one
group, are grounded in external norms, distinct from equality, and typically driven by
utilitarian concerns to maximize the level of benefits for the greatest number of persons.
The approach advocated here looks to equality for the normative basis for limits on
leveling down, focusing on how acts expressing unequal concern function to maintain
social inequality, and is notably not grounded in efficiency or utilitarian values.243 Such a

239

See id. at 2045; Sunstein, supra note 205, at 957. On the relationship between social norms
and social meaning, see Sunstein, supra note 205, at 914 (defining social norms as “social attitudes of
approval and disapproval specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done”); id. at 928
(explaining that social norms are influenced by the social meaning of actions and the social role of the
actor, and at the same time play a role in determining that social meaning).
240

Cf. Sunstein, supra note 205, at 2044 (“Antidiscrimination law is often designed to change
norms so as to ensure that people are treated with a kind of dignity and respect that discriminatory behavior
seems to deny.”).
241

See Sunstein, supra note 205, at 907 (arguing that “behavior is pervasively a function of
norms”); Sunstein, supra note 205, at 2043 (“If a discriminatory act is consistent with prevailing norms,
there will be more in the way of discriminatory behavior. If discriminators are ashamed of themselves,
there is likely to be less discrimination.”); but see Robert Scott, Symposium, The Legal Construction of
Norms: The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000)
(questioning the assumptions of expressive theorists and their belief that the expressive effects of law
stimulate changes in human behaviors). The concern suggested in the text, that uncritical acceptance of
leveling down weakens equality law’s normative force, possibly leading to more discrimination, would
apply to other weak applications of equality law as well. A strict intent requirement, for example, would
also be a subject to this criticism.
242

See KOPPELMAN, supra note 161 (arguing that cultural transformation is, and should be, the
central project of antidiscrimination law).
243

Indeed, utilitarian objections to leveling down are complicated by the instability that arises
from trying to measure persons’ preferences and levels of welfare when social norms are in flux. The
utilitarian premise is that the identity of those persons whose welfare is being measured remains stable
under the alternatives explored. However, as Professor Lessig has explained, when social meaning is
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focus better suits the remedial purpose of equality law than centering the analysis on
efficiency and utility, values not thought to be appropriately enforced by equality law.244
The two doctrinal limits that are tied to equality—where the leveling down merely
covers up continuing differential treatment (the failure to level all the way down) and
where it is premised on a discriminatory intent—do not fully capture the potential for
leveling down to violate the principle of equal concern. The first continues to assume
that differential treatment is the only harm that equality law addresses. However, as
explained above, actions that express unequal concern and solidify status differentials
have the power to perpetuate social inequality even without resort to differential
treatment. Indeed, they may be particularly effective in doing so. A limitation that
requires only that differential treatment be leveled all the way down, if at all, is blind to
the ways that the social meaning of leveling down can reproduce inequality.
The intent doctrine also is ill-suited to capture the potential for leveling down to
conflict with the norm of equal concern. If the intent doctrine evaluates an actor’s
subjective intent as the focal point for measuring compliance with equality mandates, the
search for intent is not likely to uncover the expressive meaning of an action.245 It is the
action’s public meaning that counts, not what the actor (consciously or not) intends to
express.246 The expressive meaning of an action is not necessarily a function of the
actor’s intent at all; rather, it is the socially constructed meaning that is recognizable by
the community, exercising interpretive judgment.247
A test that focuses on subjective intent is likely to prove especially obtuse as
applied to leveling down actions that violate equal concern. Constructions of social
meaning, including “defensive constructions” to preserve an existing social hierarchy, are
likely to be the most successful when they are viewed not as a direct attempt to regulate

contested, changes to social meaning may affect persons’ determinations of whether they are “better off,”
and even their very identity, insofar as it depends on stable preferences. See Lessig, supra note 205, at
1003. For example, whether whites are “better off” from the pool closure in Palmer than they would be
with integrated pools turns on conceptions of social status which are affected by social meaning. However,
because social meaning itself depends on social context, the very possibilities evaluated under utilitarian
norms may affect the identity and preferences of the persons whose welfare is being measured.
244

See Lessig, supra note 205, at 1005. See also Sunstein, supra note 205, at 954 (noting that
where social norms are part and parcel of a caste system, such that they turn a morally irrelevant
characteristic like race or gender into “a signaling device with respect to social role and associated norms,”
then the norms, roles, and meanings that perpetuate the caste system should be altered).
245

As Professor Deborah Hellman has explained, the search for expressive meaning is closer to a
search for what some scholars call an “objective intent,” as opposed to a “subjective intent.” See Hellman,
supra note 161, at 31-35. Objective intent focuses on the message that an action conveys, as distinct from
the subjective motivations underlying the action, and is often used interchangeably with “social meaning”
and “expressive content.” Id. An expressive meaning test is also distinct from discriminatory effects. Not
all actions that disproportionately harm a systemically disadvantaged social group necessarily express
unequal concern toward persons in that social group. Id.
246

Anderson & Pildes, supra note 205, at 1512-1513. See also id. at 1513 (“ultimately it is a
question of law, and hence of external normative judgment, whether the state action does indeed express
impermissible purposes or values”).
247

Id. at 1525.
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social meaning, but as predicated on some other purpose. In other words, expressive
actions have the most impact on social meaning when their expressive objective is
obscured.248 For this reason, the dynamic of status competition is particularly resistant to
a motive-centered inquiry. Status competition does not necessarily involve animus or
dislike of a competing group; rather, it is opportunistic in the sense that the higher-status
group acts to preserve its privileged status.249 Research in social psychology suggests
that disparities in social power may play a greater role in inter-group discrimination than
the dispositions of individuals who carry out the discrimination.250 Indeed, the drive to
secure status is often linked to the denial (at least at the conscious level) of a prejudiced
motivation. Strategies to further one’s own group status are therefore less effective
when, they are admittedly or transparently designed toward that end.251 As a result,
decision-makers can be expected to attribute leveling down decisions to pragmatic
determinations about resources and general welfare (as did the city in Palmer), rather
than to a desire to preserve existing social inequality or a lack of concern for the group
challenging the discrimination. Because the disavowal of a discriminatory or a selfinterested motive is necessary to an effective quest for status, a search for “a bare desire
to harm” the other group will often prove futile.252 Yet, even when individuals claim to
be motivated by material ends, they may really be struggling over status and social
meaning.253
By failing to adequately address expressive harms and injuries to social status—
injuries more likely to be borne by members of marginalized social groups—the
uncritical acceptance of leveling down incorporates an implicitly biased conception of the
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Lessig, supra note 205, at 1042.

249

See Balkin, supra note 221, at 2332.

250

See, e.g., Adams, supra note 232, at 1089, 1093 (citing social science research describing racial
inequality as “grounded in notions of group identity and group conflict,” and not individual prejudice); Luin Wang, The Complexities of “Hate,” 60 OHIO STATE L.J. 799, 880-883 (1999) (discussing social science
research emphasizing the role that social status and social solidarity in one’s own social group play in
promoting “gay-bashing”); Karen A. Hegtevdt & Karen S. Cook, Distributive Justice, in HANDBOOK OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 93, 97 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., Kluwer Academic/Plenum
Publishers, 2001) (describing research on the salience of status difference and competition between groups
as explaining the propensity for groups to pursue in-group enhancement at the expense of fairness); Richard
N. Lalonde & James E. Cameron, Behavioral Responses to Discrimination: A Focus on Action, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, v
ol. 7, 257-88, at 259 (Lawrence Erlbaum
Assocs., 1994) (criticizing the tendency to see discrimination as the behavioral component of prejudice, and
stating “[a] definition of discrimination is correct when it states that individual prejudice is not a necessary
precondition for acts of discrimination”).
251

See McAdams, supra note 231, at 1032-44 (discussing research showing that individuals are
more likely to articulate a material motive, unrelated to furthering their own status or esteem, to justify their
role in struggles over symbols and status).
252

Id. at 1060 (“when one seeks to gain status by lowering the status of others, it is all the more
important to deny that one is degrading others in order to look better by comparison”).
253

Id.
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injuries from discrimination.254 The injuries most likely to be experienced as
discriminatory by the members of dominant social groups—injuries grounded in the
materially different treatment of persons based on suspect criteria—are fully remedied by
the existing approach.
The conventional understanding privileges a view of
discrimination and its remediable injuries that coincides with the interests of relatively
dominant groups while marginalizing the interests of “outsiders” and members of socially
subordinated groups. This understanding is not preordained by the meaning of
“equality,” but merely reflects a choice to prioritize the injuries of the more powerful
while rendering the interests of others invisible. In this respect, the too-ready acceptance
of leveling down is part of the broader problem that remedies to discrimination often
neglect the interests of the persons most in need of them.255 A more complete
understanding of leveling down and its relationship to equality is needed to reconstruct
equality law so that it better represents the interests of those whom it purports to
protect.256

III.

APPLYING AN EXPRESSIVE MEANING APPROACH

Under the approach advocated here, not all leveling down responses should be
viewed in the same light. The legitimacy of leveling down as a response to inequality
depends on its expressive meaning, which turns on social context.257 In some settings, a

254

Cf. CHAMALLAS, supra note 6, at 18, 43-44, 48-49 (Aspen 2d ed. 2003) (discussing a primary
goal of much feminist scholarship to identify and seek recognition for injuries experienced by women that
are not yet recognized under existing law, and in particular applying this critique to show that the
conceptualization of equality as identical treatment reflects an implicit male norm).
255

Derrick Bell’s criticism that even the implementation of equal protection remedies has been
marked by exclusion has a particular resonance here:
The central issue in remedying past discrimination commonly has been conceived in the
following terms: “Conceding that blacks have been harmed by slavery, or segregation, or
discrimination, which groups of whites should pay the price or suffer the disadvantage
that may be incurred in implementing a policy nominally directed at rectifying that
harm?” This question, which focuses on the cost to whites of racial remedies rather than
on the necessity of relief for minorities, obviously has been framed by whites for
discussion with other whites. Their attitude is not unlike that of parents who, in the old
strict- upbringing days, might have hushed a protesting offspring with a curt, “keep quiet.
We are talking about you, not to you.
Derrick Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3
(1979).
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Cf. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 68-72 (1988) (encouraging a
“reconstructive feminist jurisprudence” that seeks to “explain or reconstruct the reforms necessary to the
safety and improvement of women's lives in direct language that is true to our own experience and our own
subjective lives.”).
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Cf. Balkin, supra note 221, at 2351 (explaining that not all status hierarchies offend equality
law, nor do all attempts to increase one group’s status at the expense of another. Rather, the critical
question is “whether state power has been harnessed to maintain or perpetuate an unjust hierarchy of social
status,” which turns on socio-historic context and socio-cultural meaning).
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refusal to share benefits with a previously excluded group contains social meanings
incompatible with equal concern, while in others, the expressive meaning may have more
to do with constraints on resources and social priorities wholly apart from status
hierarchies and relations between social groups. An approach focused on the expressive
meaning of leveling down and its relationship to equality law must examine leveling
down in each particular case and ask whether it remedies or reasserts the challenged
inequality. The examples that follow illustrate how an expressive meaning approach
might apply in this area.
A. Three Examples Where Leveling Down Conflicts with Equality Law
Returning to Palmer, the city’s decision to close the pools as the remedy to the
unlawful segregation contains an expressive message counter to equal concern. Even if,
as the Court implied in subsequent interpretations of Palmer, the city’s decision to close
the pools could not be proven to rest on a subjective animus against African Americans,
an examination of the justifications for the pool closure and the social context for the
decision reveals an expressive message of unequal concern. The city’s proffered
justification, the greater financial costs it would take to ensure public safety in integrated
pools, falls flat in light of the city’s failure to introduce evidence of a serious public
safety threat that would have required significantly greater expenditures.
Even if some greater expenditure would have been necessary, it is unlikely that
the public meaning of the pool closure in Jackson, Mississippi at that time would have
been understood as based on fiscal concerns, informed by an equal concern for providing
city benefits to all residents at a reasonable cost. Having determined public expenditures
sufficiently worthwhile to justify providing access to segregated pools, the city, assuming
it had equal concern for its African American citizens, should have been willing to spend
money to provide pool access for everyone on equal terms. Of course, it is possible that
the expenditure of funds needed to ensure safety in integrated pools (to counter the threat
of violence by those opposed to integration) would at some point become so great that the
city would be unwilling to provide pools for any of its citizens at such a high price.
However, even then, we must ask whether the city would allow such a “heckler’s veto” to
thwart public benefits deemed important for whites, instead of spending additional money
to stem the tide of lawlessness and violence that threatened such interests. For example,
if significant numbers of white citizens desired to use public parks, but felt threatened by
the presence of crime, would the city shut down the parks to avoid paying the cost of
crime control? Or would the city spend the money to provide police surveillance and
other crime control measures in order to make a desirable city resource usable for its
citizens because it values the preferences of those citizens?
Significant and
disproportionate expenditures on crime control efforts that subjugate (disproportionately
black) persons who interfere with the quality of life for other (disproportionately white)
citizens tend to suggest that local governments typically take whatever measures they feel
necessary to protect their citizenry from criminal interference.
Rather than a simple concern for cost, the greater intimacy involved in sharing
swimming pools probably explains the city’s reluctance to maintain integrated swimming
pools, despite its willingness (after a lawsuit) to integrate its public parks. The Court in
Palmer took the city’s willingness to integrate its public parks as an indication that city
officials did not have an across-the-board resistance to integration, and that the
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swimming pool context posed unique challenges. The Court’s narrow focus on the parity
of treatment led it to disregard the particular social context that shaped the expressive
meaning of the city’s decision. To a greater extent than sharing a park, sharing a
swimming pool involves a degree of closeness and intimacy that signals a measure of
social equality. The physical exposure from wearing swimsuits and the intimacy of
sharing the same water are important in understanding the city’s resistance to integrated
pools. In some respects, the threat to the social order posed by integrated pools was
similar to the threat posed by interracial sexual relationships. At the heart of the antimiscegenation statutes, as the Court correctly understood in striking down such statutes,
was the expressive message of unequal concern.258 The policing of the boundaries of
intimate relationships between persons of different races is fundamental to the
preservation of existing racial hierarchies. In light of this social history, so clearly
illustrated by the history of anti-miscegenation statutes in Mississippi itself, the pool
closure may have partly reflected city officials’ concerns about summer romances
between African American males and young white females.259 The choice of pool
closure over the operation of integrated pools underscored the message that whites and
blacks should not associate together in a social setting such as swimming that involves
intimacy and physical proximity. Rather than remedying the message of unequal concern
contained in the initial segregation, the decision to close the pools further intensified that
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See Hellman, supra note 161, at 15 (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. (1967)).
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Mississippi’s criminal prohibition on interracial marriage between white and black persons
dates back to 1865. Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, § 3, 1865 Miss. Laws (stating that “it shall not be lawful
for any freedman, free negro or mulatto to intermarry with any white person; nor for any white person to
intermarry with any freedman, free negro or mulatto; and any person who shall so intermarry shall be
deemed guilty of felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be confined in the State Penitentiary for life.”). In
1890, a prohibition on interracial marriage was added to Mississippi’s Constitution. Miss. Const. of 1890,
art. 14, § 263 (The marriage of a white person with a negro or mulatto, or person who shall have one-eighth
or more of negro blood, shall be unlawful and void.”). Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Ethridge
explained the necessity for this section as follows:
The purpose of this section is to prevent race mixtures and avoid the evils that invariably
follow such marriages. It proceeds upon the idea that the separation of the races as far as
reasonably possible will promote the public peace and welfare…. It seems that race
deterioration invariably follows … mixtures, usually the offspring of mixed marriages
partake of the vices of both races and inherit but little of their virtues…. God's plan is for
each race to live its own life and develop its own civilization, and in the providence of
God civilizations have been divergent and radically different.
GEORGE H. ETHRIDGE, MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTIONS 453-54 (1928). Mississippi’s prohibition on interracial
marriage continued to exert its influence in the courts even in 1968, the year after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Loving v. Virginia, and only three years before the Court’s decision in Palmer. See Vetrano v.
Gardner, 290 F. Supp. 200, 202-203 (N.D. Miss. 1968) (upholding the denial of social Security benefits to
children of an African American mother and white father where the parents had been unable to legally
marry under Mississippi law providing that “all bigamous, incestuous, or miscegenetic marriages are void”)
(citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 2748-01 (Cum. Supp. 1962)).
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message by showing the lengths to which whites were willing to go in order to police the
social boundaries of race.260
Palmer is also an example of a case where leveling down was a particularly
effective strategy for lowering another group’s status in relation to the socially privileged
group. Status hierarchies depend on preserving the boundaries that differentiate social
groups.261 In circumstances where a sharing of benefits would dilute the boundaries
between the groups, as in Palmer, leveling down is a singularly poor remedy for
inequality. By closing the pools instead of sharing them, whites in Jackson signaled
lower esteem for blacks, reinforcing a status differential that forbade the sharing of space
in such an intimate setting. The infliction of the material deprivation on whites
themselves reinforced the depth of the insult. By enforcing separation and exclusion
rather than expressing connection and equal membership in the community, the response
in Palmer violated the norm of equal concern.
Cazares provides a second example of a case where the leveling down decision
violated the norm of equal concern. The social meaning of the school’s decision to
cancel the National Honor Society induction was to further the status differentiation
enforced by the initial discrimination. Any plausible explanation for the school’s
decision would necessitate an expression of unequal concern for Cazares and young
women who performed their sexual and gender identities in similar ways.262 The
decision to cancel the induction ceremony was not based on the cost of adding one more
person. Instead, the cancellation sought to underscore a definition of “honor” and
“community” that excluded and devalued Cazares in relation to her peers. The action
conveyed the message that the very presence of Cazares would debase the values being
honored in the ceremony. Far from remedying the dishonor inflicted on Cazares from her
initial exclusion, cancellation further dishonored her by demonstrating the district’s depth
of commitment about her (lack of) worth. The conventions about inclusion in such
ceremonies—that their very purpose is to express appreciation and honor for the persons
included—reaffirmed this message. In all likelihood, Cazares herself (as well as other
young women in her situation) understood the cancellation as an act that devalued her,
the antithesis of an expression of equal concern.
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Of course, it is quite possible that the Court would have settled on a different interpretation of
the expressive message of the pool closure had it embarked on such an inquiry. Justice Blackmun, who
concurred in the Court’s decision, insisted: “I cannot read into the closing of the pools an official
expression of inferiority toward black citizens, as Mr. Justice White and those who join him repeatedly
assert.” Palmer, 403 U.S. at 229. As Professor Lessig has observed, “we can speak of social meanings …
without believing that there is a single, agreed-upon point for any social act.” Lessig, supra note 205, at
954-55. The inevitability of disagreement about any particular expressive meaning is not a sufficient
reason for sidestepping the inquiry. Interpretations bearing on equality will always be contested.
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Cf. McAdams, supra note 231,at 1045 (“Not only do people compete for esteem by investing
in subordination of previously defined groups, but people invest in preserving group boundaries to maintain
their position in a high-status group.”)
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For a discussion of “identity performance,” where a person “performs” his or her identity in a
way that calls attention to their membership in a subordinated group and causes discomfort to those in
power, and its function as a trigger for discrimination, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth
Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 (2001), and Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working
Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000).
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The school district’s decision in Cazares also can be understood as a contest in a
struggle to maintain the lower social status of “bad girls”—young women whose race,
class and/or sexuality brand them as less deserving of esteem than young women who are
more privileged. In Cazares’ situation, it wasn’t simply that she was a young Native
American woman who became pregnant; of equal or greater significance was the fact that
she was unmarried and not engaged to or living with the father of her child.263 Her
pregnancy made her visible as a sexual actor, and her independence from any visible
male partner in her life challenged the status of men as heads of households, protectors
and providers.264 Under these circumstances, permitting Cazares to share the stage with
other students would not only signal her worthiness as an honoree on equal terms with
her peers, it would challenge the status hierarchy of gender. Rather than honoring
Cazares as an equal, the school preferred to deprive all students of such honors.
Presumably, enough parents and students who would otherwise have benefited from the
ceremony went along with this decision, despite some cost to themselves, so as to enable
such a response. The theory of status competition explains why: in doing so, they
reaffirmed the lower status of persons like Cazares and at the same time preserved their
own higher status, either as men, or as young women who differed from Cazares in
socially significant ways.
After the cancellation, the message of unequal concern sounded by the initial
exclusion was not silenced by the end of the differential treatment; it was amplified by
the “equal” deprivation of the ceremony inflicted on other students. In language loosely
borrowed from Kenneth Karst, when the school made the initial determination to exclude
Cazares from the ceremony, it drew the boundaries of community and placed Cazares
(and others like her) outside of it.265 When this practice was identified as unlawful
discrimination, the school’s response was to relinquish that particular site of community
rather than to broaden it to include Cazares. In the battle over social meaning, the value
of the honor society to the student population at large took second place to the value of
denying Cazares—and others like her—equal concern.
As with Palmer, an inquiry into whether the leveling down response in this case
was motivated by an animus towards members’ of Cazares’ social group would have
been fruitless. The school’s decision makers could have claimed (quite honestly, in all
likelihood) that they were motivated only by a desire to promote positive social values
and not any hostility towards Cazares or young women similarly situated.
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The complexity of the subject of discrimination is an omnipresent feature in equality law, and
Cazares’ status as a young Native American woman who did not live with the father of her child involves
multiple intersecting lines of discrimination that affect the construction of her social group. See generally
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 139 (1989).
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Cf. KENNETH KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 141-46 (Yale Univ. Press 1993) (discussing the importance of
symbolism and social meaning in the debate over welfare benefits to unmarried female heads of
households).
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Id. at 88 (discussing the expressive meaning of Jim Crow, and stating that much of the Jim
Crow system was “symbolic speech,” “drawing the boundaries of community and placing black people
outside”).
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For a slightly different set of issues presented in a leveling down response,
consider a third example, the case of the Virginia Military Institute.266 The Virginia
Military Institute’s plan to go private, had it been carried out, also would have
exacerbated, rather than remedied, the underlying inequality, but at least in part for
different reasons. If VMI had proceeded with a plan to become a private university,
instead of opening its doors to women, it would have deprived men as well as women of
a public military-style education. Even though male cadets would have retained access to
a private VMI, they would have lost the benefits of attending a state-sponsored VMI. For
example, tuition for VMI cadets presumably would have increased with the loss of state
support. VMI ultimately rejected this path not because of any qualms about its legality,
but for financial considerations. However, such a response should not have been
accepted as complying with equal protection. Although not acknowledged at the time,
VMI’s plan failed even to remedy the differential treatment in the case. Because the
state’s centuries’ of investment in VMI could not be wiped out overnight, a newly
reconfigured “private” VMI still would extend to men the state-subsidized benefits made
possible by the state’s prior relationship with VMI (including the existing grounds and
facilities, as well as the intangible qualities of reputation and tradition, for which a
“private” VMI could not possibly reimburse the state). A “private” VMI would have
continued to provide men, but not women, with the benefits of a VMI-education, so that
the state effectively would have continued to subsidize the experience of men who
attended VMI.
The VMI example underscores a cautionary note that the determination of
whether leveling down complies with equality should not be made from an ahistoric
perspective that focuses only on the precise moment in time that the leveling down
remedy is implemented. In this respect, VMI’s proposal to privatize should be invalid
even under existing precedent where the Court has recognized other allegedly neutral
responses as thinly veiled efforts to hide continuing state-sponsored discrimination.267
These cases suggest that the VMI proposal to go private should have been rejected under
traditional equal protection doctrine even without attention to social meaning and its
relationship to a norm of equal concern.
Yet, even if VMI’s proposal had truly leveled the treatment for everyone by
closing its doors entirely and depriving both men and women of a VMI-education, public
or private, such a response still would conflict with the norm of equal concern. Similar to
the preceding discussions of Palmer and Cazares, such a response would have preserved
the status differential enforced by the initial exclusion of women from VMI, and possibly
even enhanced it. A decision to continue to keep women out of VMI, even at the cost of
depriving men of VMI altogether, would have signaled the extent to which women were
devalued, to the point where the very presence of women would debase a VMI-education.
Such a decision would have functioned to preserve men’s social roles as warriors and
citizens, protecting the masculine ideal of VMI from being diluted by the visibility of
women who performed the role of VMI cadets. As Kenneth Karst explains, “[b]ecause
manhood has no existence except as it is expressed and perceived, the pursuit of
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See supra text at note 25.
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See discussion supra at Part I.C.4.
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manhood is an expressive undertaking, a series of dramatic performances.”268 A leveling
down decision in this context would have functioned to preserve the social meaning of
masculinity and its linkage with civic virtue and VMI’s “citizen-soldier” ideal.
B. Three Examples Where it May Not
While the above three examples all point in the same direction, not all leveling
down remedies will necessarily violate equality law. There are at least three kinds of
situations where leveling down in response to inequality may be consistent with the value
of equal concern. First, where the injury from the inequality is a formal equality injury,
adequately redressed by the end to differential treatment, leveling down may not
necessarily signal a lack of equal concern for those challenging the inequality. Second,
where the level of treatment for the favored class has been inflated by unjust privilege,
such that it has been set based on an exclusionary norm, some leveling down may be
necessary to extend the benefit on an equal basis. Finally, there may be some instances
where inequality cannot be leveled up because the nature of the benefit itself is so
exclusionary that it cannot be extended to outsiders, such that equality must be achieved
by the elimination, not extension, of privilege. These are not completely distinct
categories, but they are detailed separately here to illustrate the variety of cases in which
leveling down may be compatible with an equal concern norm.
An example of the first situation is found in Heckler v. Mathews,269 in which the
Court upheld standing for male plaintiffs challenging the Social Security Act’s interim
provision allowing wives and widows, but not husbands or widowers, to receive full
spousal benefits, without first having to show financial dependence on a spouse or offset
other pension funds.270 In upholding standing despite a severability clause that would
have limited the remedy to a withdrawal rather than an extension of benefits, the Court
explained that the injury in an equality claim inheres in the stigma from the
discriminatory treatment and not the deprivation of the material benefit itself. Thus, the
Court found, the injury was redressable since the differential treatment could be
eliminated by denying benefits to women rather than extending them to men. Although
the Court’s appreciation of the stigmatic injury from discrimination did not fully capture
the expressive meaning of leveling down, the Court correctly concluded that any
stigmatic injury in that case was limited to the stigma that attached to the differential
treatment itself, and would be cured by equalizing the level of benefits provided to men
and women. The injury to the male plaintiff in Mathews was a formal equality injury, the
failure to treat similarly situated persons similarly. Had the plaintiff prevailed,271 the
subsequent leveling down of benefits for women would not have signaled the low social
status of men or expressed unequal concern for men.
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See KARST, supra note 264, at 113.
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465 U.S. 728 (1984).
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Id. at 730-40. This case is discussed in greater detail in Section I.C.3, above.
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As discussed above, the Court upheld the provision as a valid interim measure designed to
protect the social security system’s financial solvency and the reliance interests of those persons who
planned their retirement under the prior gender-based system. See supra note 105.
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To the extent that men experienced an expressive harm from the disadvantageous
treatment, it too would be remedied by the leveling down of benefits to women. By
providing men with less generous social security spousal benefits, the social security
provision reflected the traditional view of men as breadwinners, with the expectation that
their pensions would serve as the primary source of retirement money. This expectation
of “man as breadwinner” values a traditional version of masculinity while it marginalizes
other kinds of masculinity in which men do not serve as the primary financial providers
for their families. To the extent that the challenged law inflicted expressive harm on the
male plaintiffs by devaluing nontraditional masculinities, a shift to equal treatment
redresses this harm. With the differential expectation of men’s and women’s
breadwinning roles excised, the statute would no longer express the expectation of a
particular socially-preferred male role or marginalize nonconforming men.
Likewise, to the extent that the double-edged sword of gender stereotypes
inflicted an expressive harm on women, it too would be remedied by the elimination of
the differential treatment. By not counting women’s pensions to offset spousal benefits,
the challenged rule treated social security spousal benefits for women as a handout, not
linked to women’s participation in the workplace, reflecting the expectation that women’s
pensions would not amount to enough to warrant offsetting them against spousal benefits.
This expectation reinforced the invisibility of women as workers, treating their place in
the workplace as peripheral. This harm too would end with the uniform treatment of
social security spousal benefits for men and women. Leveling down in this case would
not devalue men or women in relation to each other, nor would it reinforce an expectation
of men as breadwinners that marginalizes other men. Indeed, the withdrawal of automatic
benefits from women, by declining to subsidize women’s presumed financial dependence
on men, could be read as contributing to a construction of relationships between men and
women based on a new benchmark of social and financial equality. In short, the
expressive harm from the stereotypes underlying the statute ended along with the
differential treatment.
The second type of situation where leveling down may satisfy a principle of equal
concern is where the level of treatment reflects an inflated privilege that was set using an
exclusionary standard. In such a case, some leveling down may be necessary to find a
sustainable and inclusive level of treatment that is consistent with equal concern. To
return to the Title IX setting, some leveling down of male athletic privilege may be
necessary to extend sport opportunities on an equal basis to women. The baseline for the
treatment of male athletes has been set in part based on notions of male privilege. In
particular, some of the privilege associated with being a male football or basketball
player in a highly esteemed sports program has been inflated by the privileging of
masculinity. Expenditures on the most highly valued men’s college sports, football and
basketball, continue to escalate at shocking rates.272 It is no coincidence that these two,
most highly funded sports are also the sports that most closely fit a cultural ideal of
masculinity that emphasizes brute force, explosive speed and a male body type that is
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See Brake, supra note 28, at 13, 76-77, 124 n.575, 125 n.581 (documenting disparities in
spending on men’s and women’s sports and large increases in spending for men’s so-called revenue
producing sports).
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highly differentiated from the feminine. The extraordinary levels of spending for these
most-valued of male sports have been set at such high levels based on an understanding
that they would not extend across the athletic program to female athletes, or even to male
athletes in less valued sports. It would break the bank to extend this level of funding to
women athletes, and it is not required by the principle of equal concern. Rather, equality
law should permit some leveling down to find a baseline that is not based on male
privilege, so that athletic programs may be equally supported based on an inclusive
model of an athlete, male or female.
It should be emphasized, however, that althought his rationale may justify cuts in
the inflated standard of living for some men’s sports teams, it does not necessarily
support cuts in the opportunities for lesser-valued men’s sports as an alternative to adding
sports for women. A proposal to do just that was offered by Brown University to comply
with Title IX in the challenge brought by female athletes seeking additional athletic
teams.273 Rather than finding a new sustainable level of funding so that equal numbers of
women could share in the benefits of sports, this proposal would have preserved the more
highly privileged status of the most-valued male athletes, while sacrificing lesser-valued
male athletes, in order to avoid having to make room for greater numbers of female
athletes. The expressive message from such an action is that women athletes are not
worth the resources necessary to support even those opportunities that had been provided
to lesser-valued male athletes, much less the reallocation of excess resources provided to
the most privileged male athletes. Brown University’s leveling down proposal was
particularly problematic because it proposed to cut even more men’s spots than necessary
to fund the additional opportunities that it would take to comply with Title IX.274 As the
district court explained, Brown proposed cutting 200 men, even though it only needed to
add about 40 new spaces for women in order to comply with Title IX. Yet, the First
Circuit chastised the district court for rejecting this proposal, holding that Title IX’s
equality mandate could be satisfied either by adding sports for women or by cutting them
from men. The court did not engage in the kind of interpretive inquiry advocated here.
Had it done so, it may well have found that the expressive meaning of Brown’s action
was to devalue female athletes as less worthy than male athletes of receiving sports
opportunities and the resources that support them.275 Indeed, Brown’s proposal to cut
enough men so that it could comply without adding a single woman to its athletic
programs was so severe as to contain a punitive message, namely, that it does not pay for
women to challenge inequality in sports. Because these messages conflict with the
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See discussion supra, text at notes 65-71.
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See discussion supra at note 69 (explaining the differences between these numbers and why the
smaller number of added opportunities for women would have complied with Title IX).
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This kind of devaluation of women’s athletic opportunities in relation to men’s was also
ubiquitous in the popular culture at the time of the litigation. See Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The
Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 51, 91 (1996)(describing a New York Times article reporting on the Cohen v. Brown
University litigation which characterized the potential loss of men’s opportunities as “more important” than
the potential for prompting new claims for additional women’s teams). It continues today in popular
debates over Title IX’s effect on men’s opportunities and the work of the Secretary’s Commission on
Opportunity in Athletics. See discussion supra, textat note 28.
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principle of equal concern, the court should have rejected the proposal as inconsistent
with Title IX’s nondiscrimination mandate.
A similar issue of how to remedy inequality in benefits when the baseline has
been inflated byprivilege surfaced in a pair of Supreme Court cases addressing sex-based
differentials in pension plans. In these cases, the Court struck down the use of sex-based
tables that disadvantaged women in pension premiums and benefits as a violation of Title
VII.276 However, the Court refused to allow “retroactive relief,” as that would have
disrupted the settled expectation of employers and plan managers to pay out a certain
level of benefits based on past premiums. The Court assumed that a leveling up remedy
that calculated future pay-outs based on premiums already paid into the system, without
regard to sex-based differentials, would require pension plans to pay women an amount
matching the higher payments to men, which had been calculated using the nowprohibited sex-based tables. The Court was unwilling to impose such a remedy for those
premiums already paid into the system because of the financial burden of imposing
unanticipated costs on employers and their pension plans. Instead, the Court required
only a remedy for premiums prospectively paid into the system, leaving unremedied
inequality in pensions based on amounts already paid into the system. As some scholars
have noted, the Court wrongly assumed that the only option was to fully elevate women’s
pensions to the higher benefit level that had been paid to men under the sex-based tables
modeled on the average male worker.277 However, because that level of benefits had
been based on a sex-specific model, using the average male worker as the norm, it was
artificially inflated by an exclusionary ideal. The Court failed to consider an alternative
choice that would have complied with equal concern: leveling the amount of benefits to
a baseline for a gender-inclusive worker with an average life expectancy (calculated on a
gender neutral basis). This choice might have eased the Court’s fear of bankrupting
pension plans, while still complying with a principle of equal concern.
A third and final example of situations where leveling down may comply with
equal concern is where the benefit at stake is so exclusionary in nature and so distorted by
privilege that it defies restructuring on an inclusive basis.278 In such cases, equality law
may require the elimination of the privilege rather than extending it to others. To return
to the athletics context, certain privileges accorded male athletes fall into this category.
At the prestigious level of NCAA Division I-A football, for example, it is a common
practice to have the football team housed in an expensive hotel the night before home
games. The rationale (such as it exists) typically rests on the difficulty otherwise of
controlling and disciplining the players to avoid the kind of behavior that would hurt their
game. The practice is uniquely applied to football players, and it is based on a model of a

276

Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Arizona
Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
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See BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 129, at 465-68 (quoting Professor Susan Deller Ross).

Cf. CHAMALLAS, supra note 6, at 101 (discussing literature on white privilege, and stating:
“Some of these everyday privileges—for instance, the ability to shop in a department store without being
followed by security personnel—are justified and should be accorded to everyone. Others—like the ability
to ignore people of lesser status—are unjustified and constitute what Martha Mahoney describes as
‘unearned power that is systematically conferred.’”).
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male athlete who embodies a ruggedly uncontrollable masculinity. Extending such a
practice to female athletes, at least on the same rationale, would make little sense.279
Instead, equality should require readjusting the athletic model upon which the practice is
based to a gender-inclusive standard that holds all athletes responsible for their own
behavior.
Other privileges afforded elite male athletes also fit this model. For example, as
the recent controversy at the University of Colorado has highlighted, male athletes on the
most valued men’s sports teams often escape standard disciplinary consequences for a
wide variety of misbehavior, including, at the extreme, rape and sexual assault of female
students.280 Their virtual exemption from institutional disciplinary structures is based on
a decidedly male ideal of an athlete as embodying a particularly virulent form of hypermasculinity, and the structuring of athletic privilege around that ideal. Equality does not
require the extension of such “privileges” to female athletes, and is best served by
eliminating them completely.
A final example of this third type of case, where an exclusionary benefit defies
restructuring on an inclusive basis—and one toward which I confess a greater degree of
ambivalence than the prior examples—comes from a case involving the cancellation of a
school play thought to be limiting in its roles for African American students. In
Mayberry v. Waverly Public Schools,281 the school district cancelled the school play once
it learned of the drama teacher’s decision not to cast an African American student in a
theatrical production of “Arsenic and Old Lace.” The teacher’s reason for not casting the
student was that she “did not think the audience would accept an interracial family set in
the 1930s or 1940s.” Instead of reversing the teacher’s decision when it was challenged,
the school district cancelled the play and decided to seek out other theatrical
opportunities for the student, both in the school district and at other schools and private
institutions. The court held that this was an appropriate remedy to the discrimination by
the teacher, based on its assumption that leveling down is always an acceptable remedy to
an equality claim. As the court explained, “all students were treated equally with regard
to participation in the play.”282 However, if the court is right that this remedy corrects the
prior inequality, it is not merely because all students are treated the same with respect to
the school play. Rather, it is because the selection of this particular school play, in which
roles for African American students are inadequate or non-existent, confers a privilege on
students of other races (who can participate in the play) that cannot be restructured on an
inclusive basis. If there truly were no theatrically appropriate roles for African American
students in the play, the expressive meaning of the play’s cancellation would be to
recognize that it is wrong to offer such a benefit that cannot be shared with African
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American students. The cancellation then would be an appropriate elimination of white
privilege, consistent with equal concern.
My ambivalence about this example comes from my strong skepticism that the
benefit in question really could not have been made available to African American
students on an equal basis. If the drama teacher’s decision was itself based on biased
notions of proper racial roles in the play and in society at large, or reflected an
accommodation of audience racism, then the cancellation of the play may be read as
endorsing racial prejudice in a way that furthers the expressive harm of the discrimination
in casting. It would have been more consistent with equal concern to challenge fixed
notions about racially appropriate roles, using the play as a teaching tool to challenge
racism both in the society in which the play was set and in modern-day audience
expectations. Read in this light, the decision to cancel the play, rather than adopt a
racially inclusive approach to casting, preserved and reinforced the outsider status of
African American students in the broader school community. In the final analysis,
whether the cancellation was an appropriate remedy to inequality or furthered the
expressive harm of the discrimination turns on the expressive meaning of the
cancellation, which is itself subject to dispute and multiple interpretations.
As this last example suggests, difficult interpretive questions may arise in
distinguishing between leveling down as a legitimate reassessment of privilege and
leveling down as an expression of unequal concern. Yet, engaging in such an analysis
has the advantage of taking into consideration the kinds of questions that should be
important to equality law, rather than assuming that all leveling down responses are the
same and fully satisfy equality norms. It also has the advantage of causing us to think
more deeply about inequality and discrimination by recognizing the existence of
unjustified privilege, and the failure to extend justified privilege, as lapses of equal
concern, wholly apart from the existence of differential treatment.283

IV.

ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER EQUALITY’S NORMATIVE VALUE

The approach taken here contrasts sharply with scholarly accounts of leveling
down in the legal literature debating equality’s normative appeal. In contrast to the
inattention to leveling down in other areas of legal scholarship, leveling down has figured
prominently in the ongoing debate about whether the ideal of equality, which has
occupied such a large space in moral and legal discourse, has any independent meaning
and/or normative appeal. The critics of equality cite the permissibility of leveling down
in support of their overall critique of equality rights. Equality’s defenders respond to the

283

For literature on white privilege and arguments that discrimination law should be understood as
addressing questions of privilege, see Tina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of
Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Betweern Racism and Sexism (or other isms), in
STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 87
(1996); Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege
Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881 (1995); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”: White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Martha R.
Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 (1995).

68

LEVELING DOWN

[March 1, 2004

leveling down objection either by arguing that leveling down is not as problematic as the
critics assume, or by contending that it is not quite so unlimited a response as equality’s
critics contend. However, neither the critics nor the defenders of equality sufficiently
grapple with the expressive meaning of leveling down in concrete cases and how social
context affects the compatibility of leveling down with equality rights. As a result, both
sides of the debate are too sanguine about the flexibility of equality rights in accepting
leveling down and stop short of fully acknowledging the possibilities for equality-based
limits on leveling down.
A. Equality’s Critics and the Leveling Down Objection
Spawning a burgeoning legal literature, Peter Westen first launched the debate in
legal circles over equality’s moral value with the publication of his article, “The Empty
Idea of Equality.”284 As the title suggests, Professor Westen took the position that
equality as a normative principle has no independent content—that it does not prescribe
any way of acting that is not also compelled by other, non-comparative norms.285
Westen’s later writing qualified his initial, more skeptical thesis to some extent,286 but
many of the questions raised in Westen’s initial critique continue to percolate in legal
scholarship. Numerous scholars responded to Westen, arguing that the ideal of equality
does have normative force and that it should continue to hold a prominent place in law
and morality.287
In recent years, a revised critique of equality drawing on and extending Westen’s
initial thesis has generated new interest in the question of whether equality is an empty or
even objectionable ideal. Christopher Peters has presented a complex argument that goes
beyond Westen’s more limited critique of equality to advocate the abandonment of
prescriptive equality in legal and political rhetoric.288 Peters, more so than Westen,
specifically objects to what he views as the inherent acceptability of leveling down in
response to assertions of equality rights. In his indictment of equality, Peters contends
that to the extent that equality has any independent normative force, it lacks normative
appeal because it requires absurd results. Peters agrees with Westen that, if equality is
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defined as Westen defined it, “treat likes alike,” it is reduced to a tautology and empty of
any normative content.289 However, Peters argues that equality has a non-tautological
meaning in the following sense: when one person or group has received better treatment
than what is deserved under the relevant criteria, then a similarly situated person or group
may assert an equality right to that same (also incorrect, according to relevant criteria)
treatment. Peters labels this kind of equality “non-tautological prescriptive equality.” He
concedes that this version of equality has normative content and is not empty. However,
he contends that it is “worse than empty; it is both incongruous and inherently unjust, and
thus it is morally invalid.”290
It is in this context that Peters addresses leveling down as a response to inequality.
Peters views the acceptability of leveling down as symptomatic of what is wrong with
prescriptive equality: when one group has been wrongly denied a benefit under the
relevant criteria, a similarly situated group that has (correctly) enjoyed that benefit may
be brought down to the (incorrect) level of the first group. In discussing this problem,
Peters starts from the premise that an actor who is constrained by an equality principle
may always comply with that principle by lowering the level of treatment for those who
are better off to the level of those who are worse off. For Peters, the right to equality is
satisfied by equal treatment, in either direction.
Using this reasoning, Peters launches a two-fold attack on equality rights. On the
one hand, he argues, prescriptive equality is meaningless in that it says nothing about
how to determine the proper level of treatment for anyone; the substantive criteria for
determining who deserves what level of treatment must be derived from external
substantive rules, independent of equality. For example, the substantive rule of treatment
for Jackson city services might be that all city residents deserve access to any public
swimming pool. If Jackson then provides access to public pools to some but not other
residents, it has violated this substantive rule. Equality rights, under this argument, are
devoid of content in that they merely “piggy-back” on the guiding substantive rule,
without having any input into the content of the underlying substantive rule. Under this
reasoning, if some city residents are denied access to pools, in violation of the substantive
rule, they should be able to secure the proper treatment under that substantive rule,
without resort to equality rights.
On the other hand, Peters argues, to the extent that prescriptive equality does have
meaning, that meaning is unjust. Although prescriptive equality says nothing about the
content of the substantive rule, it may serve as the reason for extending incorrect
treatment to additional persons. For example, if some city residents have been
incorrectly (under the relevant substantive criteria) denied access to public pools,
prescriptive equality might serve as the basis for extending that incorrect treatment to
those city residents who had been properly (under the same relevant substantive criteria)
permitted access to city pools. Accordingly, Peters argues, prescriptive equality is worse
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than meaningless; it is unjust. To Peters, the permissibility of leveling down supports the
rejection of equality rights altogether.
As an example of how equality rights produce harmful and unjust consequences,
Peters invokes Palmer v. Thompson.291 As Peters reads Palmer, the Court endorsed the
egalitarian premise that the unjust denial of a benefit to one group warrants the further
unjust denial of that benefit to a similarly situated group. Peters views this premise as the
remedial conclusion to be drawn from prescriptive equality, which he defines as holding
that treating one person or group in a certain way is sufficient reason for according the
same treatment to a similarly situated group.292
Another example Peters uses to illustrate the leveling down objection to equality
rights comes from litigation challenging inequality in school funding.293 In response to a
New Jersey Supreme Court ruling that the state constitution requires equal funding for
public schools,294 then-Governor Christine Whitman proposed a remedial plan that would
lower spending in richer districts to the level of funding for poorer districts. Although
Governor Whitman ultimately retreated from this proposal in response to pressure from
irate parents, Peters cites the incident as an example of the harmful and unjust
consequences of prescriptive equality.295
To Peters, Palmer and the New Jersey school funding cases demonstrate the harm
of applying prescriptive equality for its own sake. Peters contends that the very real
possibility that one group may become worse off simply because the same fate has
befallen a similarly situated group warrants the rejection of prescriptive equality as a
principle of justice. Peters draws on scholars in other fields, such as philosophy and
political science, who have likewise invoked the problem of leveling down as a reason
for rejecting equality as an independent norm.296 Like Peters, these scholars claim that
equality is not defensible if it results in a leveling down of benefits that makes the
favored group worse off and the disfavored group no better off.297
The expressive meaning approach to leveling down advocated here contrasts
sharply with the treatment of leveling down by Peters and the critics of equality. Both
approaches share an assessment that leveling down in response to inequality raises issues
that are more problematic than generally acknowledged. However, Peters’ objection to
leveling down stem
s from utilitarian calculations rather than a concern for remedying
injuries of the persons asserting equality rights. Under the expressive meaning approach,
the problem with leveling down is not the utilitarian one of diverting social resources
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from their presumptively most beneficial use.298 Rather, it is that leveling down may
express unequal concern and solidify social inequality. More significantly, Peters’
approach concedes too readily that leveling down always satisfies equality rights, based
on a cramped definition of equality as limited to the protection from differential
treatment. Peters focuses on the injustice of compounding one wrongful material
deprivation with another in a case like Palmer, without fully considering whether the
leveling down in Palmer exacerbated the injuries of the African American residents of
Jackson and violated the principle of equal concern.
Peters’ equating of Palmer and the New Jersey school funding cases is
symptomatic of a narrow view of equality as equal treatment. Peters assumes that the
two cases are alike in that both leveling down responses fully satisfy equality rights.
However, if the animating principle in an equality right is equal concern, the two cases
differ significantly. As elaborated above, the leveling down in Palmer expressed unequal
concern and functioned as a last-ditch effort to preserve the existing social meanings of
race and the attendant racial hierarchy. The message and the resulting stigma from the
pool closures cut to the heart of an equality right. In the New Jersey funding case, on the
other hand, it is not so clear that the leveling down in funding conflicts with equal
concern. Peters laments the unfortunate state of affairs that would occur if one school
received less funding than it otherwise would have simply because another school
received less funding that it should. Although such a result may indeed be regrettable as
a matter of social policy (at least for the children who attend the wealthier school), it may
or may not be problematic as measured against a principle of equal concern. If the level
of funding for richer districts could not be sustained if the state had to ensure equal
funding to all other districts, equal concern may require resetting the baseline in order to
share the resources at a sustainable level. The implementation of those reductions in
funding which are necessary to set a sustainable baseline for all school districts would
diminish rather than entrench social stratification and status differentials among persons
in relatively wealthier and poorer districts. Of course, social context matters. If
Governor Whitman’s proposal lowered the richer district’s funding more than necessary
and set a baseline lower than the average level of wealth, her proposal wouldbe more
problematic. In that case, setting the baseline below an average sharing of the wealth
would punish the plaintiffs by minimizing the gains from their equality challenge, and
express unequal concern by signaling that children in more wealthy districts deserve all
the money available for their education, while children in poorer districts are less worthy
of maximized educational resources.
Peters’ failure to engage a norm of equal concern that is sensitive to expressive
meaning and its role in reproducing inequality leads him to the conclusion that the
inherent acceptability of leveling down in response to equality rights weighs in favor of
abandoning equality rights altogether. However, leveling down is more often in tension
with equality law and the principle of equal concern than is generally recognized. An
expressive meaning approach sensitive to the social setting in which inequality occurs
would limit leveling down responses more than equality’s critics acknowledge.
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B. The Treatment of Leveling Down by Equality’s Defenders
Unlike equality’s critics, legal scholars who have weighed in to defend equality
rights do not view leveling down as a reason for rejecting equality as a principle of
justice. However, their responses concede too much remedial flexibility to equality,
albeit not quite as much as equality’s critics. The defense of equality could be
strengthened by a greater attention to the expressive meaning of leveling down, and how
that expressive meaning may conflict with a requirement of equal concern.
Numerous legal scholars have responded to the critique of equality described
299
above.
Responses to the leveling down objection tend to take one of two forms. One
approach concedes that leveling down is a permissible response to the assertion of
equality rights, but argues that it is not as problematic as equality’s critics contend. The
other approach argues that the permissibility of leveling down is overstated, and seeks to
elaborate the conditions under which leveling down is an acceptable response to the
assertion of equality rights. This second approach has the most in common with the
expressive meaning approach advocated in this Article. However, even here, the
defenders of equality stop short of recognizing the full extent of the potential
incompatibility between leveling down and equality rights. The following discussion
focuses on the work of Professor Kenneth Simons, as he is the legal scholar who has
written most extensively on the leveling down objection in the defense of equality, and
his defense illustrates both types of approaches to the leveling down objection.300
In his defense of equality, Professor Simons makes the first type of argument
when he contends that equality’s critics have overstated the undesirability of leveling
down responses.301 He argues that leveling down may avoid the stigmatic harm that
comes from unequal treatment, thereby creating a better state of affairs than the initial
inequality. He explains:
Leveling down is not always troubling. If the benefit in question is not of
great importance, and the seriousness of the equality violation depends
significantly on the invidiousness of the trait (as in cases of racial
discrimination), then the leveling down is not problematic.302
Simons offers the example of a hypothetical university President who greets every
alumni/alumnae at a reception with a voice greeting, and also shakes the hands of white
alumni, but not black alumni.303 Leveling down by simply greeting everyone by voice
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and not shaking any hands would be an appropriate remedy, Simons claims, because it
would discontinue the stigma to blacks from the prior practice.
Unlike equality’s critics, Professor Simons recognizes the importance of stigma as
a significant harm from inequality. However, he too readily assumes that leveling down
remedies that stigma, viewing the stigma as tied to the differential treatment. However,
as discussed previously, even facially neutral treatment can inflict expressive harm and
stigma, and leveling down may actually exacerbate the expressive harms of the prior
unequal treatment. To use the handshake example, Professor Simons’ analysis does not
allow for the possibility that the refusal to shake anyone’s hand, if handshakes may not be
racially selective, may magnify rather than reduce the stigma. The legitimacy of the
refusal to shake hands depends on its expressive meaning. In my view, the refusal to
shake hands with anyone in response to an equality claim challenging racially selective
handshakes sounds alarmingly similar to the refusal by whites to share pools with blacks
in Palmer. Simons’ qualification limiting leveling down’s acceptability to cases in which
the benefit at issue is not of great importance does not allay this concern. The expressive
harm of leveling down may exist regardless of the significance of the benefit, if the
across-the-board withdrawal of the benefit is premised on a message of disregard and
unequal concern.
Perhaps one reason why Professor Simons is not as troubled by leveling down as
equality’s critics is that he has greater faith in the political process to provide sufficient
protection against the harms of leveling down. As he explains:
[A]n important political constraint often, as a practical matter, limits the
scope and severity of both the multiplication of wrong and the leveling
down objections. Equality rights are often invoked by minorities. If
government responds to a violation by multiplying the wrong or by
leveling down (in the sense of depriving a larger group of an entitlement),
this will burden, or deny a benefit to, a larger class of persons—possibly a
much larger class. This larger class might well employ the political
process to ensure that the problem is remedied by government eliminating
rather than multiplying the wrong, by leveling up instead of down.304
However, as explained above, when leveling down occurs as a defensive construction of
social meaning, this faith in the political process is misplaced.305 It rests on a mistaken
assumption that majority only concerns itself with material goods, and ignores how the
relational aspects of leveling down can function to preserve unequal social arrangements.
While equality’s critics are too quick to invoke the harmfulness of leveling down
as a reason for abandoning equality altogether, equality’s defenders are not as troubled by
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it as they should be. Neither the remedying of stigma linked to differential treatment nor
the opportunity for political process-based limits are sufficient answers to the propensity
for leveling down to leave persons worse off for asserting equality rights.
Perhaps because of some lingering discomfort with leveling down, Professor
Simons is troubled enough by the prospect of leveling down that he devotes a great deal
of space to elaborating limits on it as a response to inequality.306 This work falls under
the second type of argument in response to the leveling down objection: that equality’s
critics overstate the permissibility of leveling down. Professor Simons grounds this
discussion in his broad definition of equality rights as including “not just the tangible
benefits and burdens distributed by a decisionmaker, but the deeper and more subtle
question of how a distributional decision affects the status of different social groups.”307
Professor Simons then locates the limit on leveling down at the line between what he
terms “pure” and “impure” equality rights.308 A “pure” equality right is satisfied either
by leveling up or leveling down,309 while an “impure” equality right is asymmetrical and
permits remedying the inequality in only one direction.310 This definitional framework
serves as the primary vehicle for explaining whether a particular equality claim permits
leveling down as a remedy to inequality.311
Simons offers several examples to add content to his distinction between pure and
impure equality rights. As examples of impure equality rights, Simons points to
discrimination statutes that explicitly reject leveling down remedies and the presence of
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principles external to equality that set a fixed level of treatment.312 In contrast, Simons
mentions the equal protection clause as an example of a pure equality right which may be
satisfied either by leveling up or by leveling down.
In addition to these examples, Simons offers one more suggestion for how to
distinguish a pure equality right, which always permits leveling down, from an impure
equality right, which does not. He contends that impure equality rights are more
plausible where the inequality is premised on an impermissible trait.313 He explains this
distinction by looking at the nature of the injury from the equality violation. Where
inequality is based on a suspect trait, the injury often involves the harm of stigma. In
such cases, he acknowledges, a leveling down remedy may not cure the stigma. Instead,
it may add injury (in the form of denial of benefits) to insult by taking away material
benefits, whereas leveling up would at least offer “the salve of tangible benefits.”314 In
contrast, Simons continues, when a pure equality right is violated, the injury consists
solely of the inequality of tangible benefits. In such cases, leveling down by
redistributing resources may adequately address this harm.
This is the part of Simons’ analysis that comes the closest to pinning down why
and under what circumstances leveling down conflicts with equality. Still, the analysis
does not fully explore the relationship between leveling down and equality from the
perspective of an expressive meaning approach. Depending on the social context,
leveling down may not only fail to remedy the stigma from discrimination based on
impermissible traits, it may actually exacerbate and intensify that stigma. Where Simons
views leveling down in such cases as adding injury (in the form of the withholding of
benefits) to insult (in the form of the stigma from the differential treatment), it would be
more accurate to say that it adds insult (additional stigma) to injury (the preexisting
deprivation of benefits). Leveling down in a case like Palmer inflicts additional injury in
that the pre-existing denial of benefits is now accompanied by further stigma. This is
more than a matter of semantics. The expressive harm of leveling down inflicts a statusbased stigma that compounds the stigma from the previous differential treatment. In
Palmer, the closure of the pools may have been even more stigmatizing than the initial
segregation. The message that blacks are unfit to swim with whites was compounded by
the demonstration of the depth of feeling with which this view was held; whites were
willing even to deprive themselves of pools to keep existing racial boundaries intact.
More fundamentally, the presence or absence of a suspect trait should not in itself
determine whether leveling down is compatible with equality rights. Leveling down has
very different implications for the equality right in a case like Heckler v. Mathews than
Cazares, even though both cases involve responses to sex-based discrimination. The
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critical difference in the two cases is how the social meaning of leveling down works to
solidify status hierarchies and structure social relations.315
In the end, Simons’ framework for setting equality-based limits on leveling down
turns on a somewhat elusive distinction between pure and impure equality rights. This
emphasis on the classification of the equality right as determinative of the permissibility
of leveling down does not fully engage the reasons why leveling down may or may not
satisfy equality law. For example, although Simons is clearly correct in his examples of
statutory rights that fit his definition of impure equality rights, it is not so clear that equal
protection is a “pure” equality right such that it may always be remedied by leveling
down. If the underlying norm of equal protection is not equal treatment, but equal
concern, the determination of whether leveling down remedies an equal protection
violation must be context-dependent.316
Simons’ analysis of impure equality rights as a constraint on leveling down
remains an important recognition in the literature that leveling down is not always a
permissible response to inequality. However, rather than requiring the classification
system for pure and impure equality rights to perform the analytical work of determining
leveling down’s compatibility with equality law, the analysis would be furthered by a
context-driven analysis of the expressive meaning of leveling down and its consistency
with the principle of equal concern. If, as Simons recognizes is sometimes the case, the
injury from inequality is not limited to the material deprivation itself, but extends to
social relations and the relative standing of social groups,317 then the acceptability of
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See discussion of these cases supra, Part III.
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It is not at all clear that Simons would disagree with this, even though he classifies equal
protection as a pure equality right, since he acknowledges that some facially neutral actions not premised
on a conscious discriminatory intent may still violate equality’s requirement of equal respect and concern.
For example, Simons views Palmer as a case where the formally similar treatment rested on selective
sympathy, in violation of equal concern. Id. at 721. From this, it is clear that Simons believes that the pool
closure in Palmer conflicted with the equality guarantee, but it is not clear why, since he otherwise
identifies equal protection as a “pure” equality right. Presumably, Simons would not view the pool closure
as a true leveling down response, but rather as an example of a case where the greater concern afforded
white residents in Jackson was not leveled all the way down to the very low level of concern shown for
blacks. Id. at 722. But this meaning of leveling down, as referring to the level of concern rather than the
level of treatment, differs from how Simons’ defines leveling down elsewhere as the leveling of treatment.
Id. at 707 (stating that a genuine equality right may be remedied either by extending benefits to all relevant
persons or by uniformly denying benefits to all relevant persons). Using a treatment-focused definition of
leveling down, Simons states that a genuine equality right (unless it is an impure equality right) may always
be cured by a uniform denial of benefits. Id. The leveling down objection as framed by equality’s critics
also generally presupposes a leveling of treatment, not necessarily of concern.
317

Id. at 710 n.60 (citing and quoting from David Miller, Arguments for Equality, 7 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 73 (1982) (noting that “egalitarian arguments for equality are all sensitive to relational factors
and ‘concerned not merely with how well off individuals are, measured along some dimension, but with the
relative standing of different people on that dimension’”); id. at 713 (“Equality rights can demand
quantitatively identical treatment of classes, but they can also require the reduction or minimization of
inequality.”); id. at 739-40 (discussing stigma and status-based harms of discrimination).
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leveling down as a response to inequality should depend on whether it remedies or
exacerbates the relational injuries with which equality is concerned.318
C. How Attention to Social Context and Expressive Meaning Would Enrich the
Debate
Both sides in the debate over equality’s normative appeal fall short of fully
accounting for the ways in which leveling down may conflict with equality rights. The
understanding of leveling down is ultimately distorted by the artificiality of the types of
examples typically used, and suffers from a highly abstracted logical and moral reasoning
that is common to this genre of scholarship.319 The equality under discussion is largely a
bloodless and rarefied equality about children deprived of dessert and Rhodes scholars
denied fellowships. Kenneth Karst’s contribution to this debate is atypical in this respect,
relying heavily on social context and history to explain why equality is meaningful,
although he does not address the leveling down objection specifically.320 However, for
the most part, other than an occasional reference to Palmer, it is difficult to get a sense
from this literature about how leveling down actually works in the legal system to
solidify and perpetuate social relationships of inequality. The ahistoric and abstract
nature of the debate detracts from a complete understanding of what is at stake in leveling
down and its relationship to equality law.
As an illustration of how hypothetical examples ungrounded in the case law may
influence the analysis, consider an example used by Professor Simons of inequality in a
parent’s allocation of dessert to his children. In his discussion of the criteria that define
pure equality rights, Simons uses as an example a parent’s promise that if one child is
permitted to have dessert, both children will be permitted to have it.321 Simons observes
that if one child is then given dessert but the other is not, the harm from the inequality is
not limited to the (presumptively) incorrect denial of the dessert to the deprived child. At
the same time, he notes, the harm may be remedied by depriving both children of
dessert.322 The outcome of this example may be correct.323 However, if it is correct, its
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Although Simons offers a nuanced and contextual analysis of the relational aspects of equality
norms, he does not follow these insights to their full conclusion at the remedial stage of the analysis, and so
overstates the remedial flexibility of equality norms. Id. at 711 (stating that comparative equality rights
“may be flexibly remedied,” and offering as an example: “If a court finds that someone has committed an
equal protection violation, it may, consistent with the egalitarian norms embodied in the equal protection
clause, permit him to respond either by extending or by denying the benefits to both classes”).
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Cf. Gewirtz, supra note 30, at 585 (criticizing highly abstracted, counter realistic scholarship
on remedies).
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See Karst, supra note 287.
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Simons, supra note 299, at 706.
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The reaction of my colleague, Tom Ross, with whom I shared this example, caused me to
question whether even this seemingly trivial example of leveling down really remedied the injury from the
inequality. Unless there was not enough ice cream to go around, the parent’s response in withholding ice
cream from both children who are, as the hypothetical assumes, equally deserving of it, seems harsh and
uncaring. The expressive meaning of this response may be to punish the second child for asserting an equal
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correctness lies in its social context, not in any inherent feature of equality rights
generally. In this example, the denial of dessert to both children only remedies the harm
of the inequality if the injury amounts to a formal equality injury, limited to the
differential treatment. As long as the stigma to the dessert-less child inheres in the
differential treatment itself, it is cured by the end of the differential treatment. In that
case, the parent’s remedial decision to deny both children dessert would not represent a
move to preserve the social dominance of the dessert-eating child or to devalue the
dessert-deprived child as unworthy in a way that reinforces the higher status of the first
child. Nor, presumably, wouldthe resulting denial of dessert to both children express a
desire to punish the second child for asserting a right to be treated on the same terms as
the first child. But if we change the social context to one where status differentials and
social stratification matter, it is not at all clear that a uniform denial of a benefit satisfies
the equality right. The disparate dessert example may be analogous to the male
plaintiff’s challenge of the differential treatment in social security benefit calculations in
Heckler v. Mathews—a formal equality injury—but it is a far different case from the
injury to status and the exclusionary meaning of the school district’s cancellation of the
honor society in Cazares.
A more nuanced understanding of leveling down and its relationship to equality,
one grounded in the reality of leveling down as it plays out in actual cases, would further
the debate over equality’s value in important respects. A more critical approach to
leveling down that focuses on whether its expressive meaning comports with equal
concern would support an understanding of equality that is less formalistic, more
situational, and sensitive to status and social relations. It would shape equality as a
worthy and valuable legal construct, not one that permits absurd results, like the pool
closure in Palmer, which we know, at a gut level, to be wrong. Equality should not leave
everyone worse off, particularly the very persons whom the law aspires to make whole.
To a modest degree, such a rehabilitation of equality law would help make equality rights
worth fighting for. Although equality law is frequently unsuccessful in performing its
aspirational work, and woefully inadequate as a litigation tool in challenging entrenched
discrimination, these shortcomings stem from the diluted version of equality embodied in
much of current anti-discrimination doctrine, and not any inherent limitation in an
equality principle per se.

CONCLUSION
A legal system’s commitment to remedying inequality says a great deal about the
kind of equality to which that system subscribes.324 The uncritical acceptance of leveling
down as a remedy to inequality reinforces a particular version of equality that does less
than it should for those in need of it, and makes the assertion of equality rights unpopular

claim to ice cream, or reaffirm the favored status of the first child by denying the second child the chance to
share in the gift of ice cream and the affection it represents. The expressive message to the second child
seems capricious at best and hostile at worst. If equal concern requires a commitment to caring and respect
on equal terms, the response may well violate equality’s mandate.
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See generally Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (discussing
the importance of “commitment” to law, and how that commitment itself creates legal meaning).
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and unappealing. Nothing in American law, or in the nature of equality rights generally,
requires such an approach.
This Article has sought to shed greater light on the potential for leveling down to
thwart discrimination claims and preserve entrenched inequalities, in the hope that a
greater understanding of the problem will spur new efforts to secure a more meaningful
equality that does not punish those who seek it. The problem of leveling down calls for
greater reflection on the meaning of equality as it is guaranteed in law, and a greater
appreciation of the nonmaterial injuries of inequality. An understanding of equality that
transcends a limited right to equal treatment, and protects against the expressive and
relational injuries of inequality, would grant much less room for leveling down than the
conventional understanding has allowed.

